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INTRODUCTION
The original purposes of eavesdropping statutes were to protect the citizen
against government intrusion into the citizen's privacy and to authorize law enforcement
interception to fight organized crime.' Yet, in certain instances, the statutes have been
used offensively by the government to avoid citizen oversight of policing and even to
intimidate citizens. These uses are far different from the original legislative intent behind
the statutes, doing nothing to thwart organized crime activities and significantly
interfering in the lives of otherwise law-abiding citizens. The prohibition against taping
police activity ultimately hurts society more than it benefits society, given over-
enforcement of eavesdropping statutes and under-enforcement of discipline or penalties
for officers lying or falsifying evidence. The over-enforcement of eavesdropping statutes
must be viewed against the backdrop of officer falsification of evidence and the police
code of silence.
Citizens who audio record or videotape conversations run the risk of being
arrested for violating eavesdropping statutes, especially in the eleven states that require
all-party consent prior to taping. Even in a one-party consent state, there may be grounds
to arrest the citizen if the citizen is a bystander rather than a party to the conversation. The
risk is greater where the person being recorded is a police officer because the police
officer may feel challenged by a civilian recording the police officer's actions; this is so
although several federal circuit courts have found that the First Amendment protects
gathering such information. The civilian fear of arrest for taping an encounter involving a
police officer has a chilling effect on the civilian's gathering of information concerning
law enforcement, as the eavesdropping statutes in most jurisdictions carry a hefty prison
term, or fine, or both for their violation.
Two federal courts of appeals have found that the First Amendment protects
civilian taping of encounters with police officers.2 Those decisions and the Department of
Justice's statement of interest in Garcia v. Montgomery County, Maryland3 may signal a
trend in the law. In effect, the scales may be tipping in favor of sanctioning civilian
recording of encounters with police officers.
The facts of Garcia are discussed in Section I. Section II provides information on
eavesdropping statutes of various jurisdictions, as does Appendix A, and Section III
reviews federal court decisions considering whether there is First Amendment protection
for civilian taping. Section IV discusses officer falsification of evidence and the police
code of silence. Section V analyzes the role civilian taping plays in society and Section VI
proposes an exemption to eavesdropping statutes that would safeguard a civilian's right to
tape an encounter with a police officer.
' See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153, 2157, for the Senate report
that accompanied the passage of the federal eavesdropping statutes in 1968. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 630
(West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.01(3), (4) (West 2001); and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 272, § 99(A)
(West 2014) for the state statutes of three all-party consent states.
2 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012), on remand, No.
10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2012) (granting the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and a permanent injunction); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78,82 (1st Cir. 2011).
3
See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CASE OF MANNIE GARCIA
The following case is illustrative of what can happen when police officers take
offense at a civilian recording a police encounter.
Mannie Garcia is a well-known freelance photojournalist whose photos have
appeared in national publications, such as The New York Times and Newsweek and
international publications such as Der Spiegel.4 He was leaving a restaurant with his wife
and a friend on June 16, 2011 when he spotted several Montgomery County, Maryland
police officers arresting two male Hispanics at a nearby intersection. Believing that the
officers were using excessive force in making the arrest, Garcia began to photograph the
incident from a distance of some thirty feet. When Officer Baxter shone a spotlight on
him, Garcia retreated to a distance of almost 100 feet. As Officer Malouf approached
Garcia, Garcia identified himself as a member of the press. Officer Malouf announced that
Garcia was under arrest, restrained Garcia in a choke hold, dragged him to the patrol car,
placed handcuffs on Garcia, and confiscated Garcia's camera.5 While Garcia was in
handcuffs, Officer Malouf kicked one of Garcia's feet out from under him, resulting in
Garcia's head hitting the patrol car. When Garcia's wife asked Officer Baxter what was
happening, Officer Baxter threatened to arrest her also. Officer Malouf placed Garcia in
the patrol car and drove Garcia to the police station. Outside the police station, Garcia
6observed Officer Malouf remove the video card and battery from Garcia's camera.
Garcia was charged with disorderly conduct under Maryland Criminal Code §
10-201.7 On December 16, 2011 following trial, the judge declared Garcia not guilty." A
police department investigation reached the finding on April 12, 2012 that there had been
no administrative violation.9 Garcia filed a title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on December 7,
2012 against Montgomery County, Maryland and several officers, including Officer
Malouf and Officer Baxter, claiming, among other things, that they had deprived him of
his First and Fourth Amendment rights.10
On March 4, 2013, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) took the rare
step of filing a Statement of Interest in Garcia's § 1983 action asking the court to find that
"both the First and Fourth Amendments protect an individual who peacefully photographs
police activity on a public street, if officers arrest the individual and seize the camera of
that individual for that activity."" The DOJ then proceeded to make two other points, the
first of which was to recognize that a police department often uses certain "discretionary"
charges of general applicability such as "disorderly conduct, loitering, disturbing the
peace, and resisting arrest" to dissuade citizens from exercising their First Amendment
right and to urge a court encountering these types of charges to examine them critically as







'0 Id. at 12-14.
" Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Garcia v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., No. 8:12-cv-03592-JFM (D.
Md. Mar. 4, 2013). The United States filed a similar Statement of Interest in a second Maryland case. Statement
of Interest of the United States, Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dep't., No. 1:11-cv-02888 (D. Md. Jan. 10,
2012), 2012 WL 9512053.
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a subterfuge for curtailing constitutionally protected conduct. 12 "Core First Amendment
conduct, such as recording a police officer performing duties on a public street, cannot be
the sole basis for such charges."1 3 The second point was that it is not just the media, but
individuals also, who enjoy the First Amendment right to tape police activities.14 "The
derogation of these rights erodes public confidence in our police departments, decreases
the accountability of our governmental officers, and conflicts with the liberties that the
Constitution was designed to uphold."1 5
In addition to eavesdropping charges, discretionary charges are often used against
a civilian recording an encounter with a police officer. However, use of these charges
against a civilian recording this type of encounter flies in the face of the First Amendment.
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Houston ordinance as overbroad
because it criminalized civilian speech that "in any manner . . . interrupt[s]" a police
officer.16 Similar to other discretionary charges used in civilian taping cases, the Houston
ordinance "accord[ed] the police unconstitutional discretion in enforcement."17 "The
freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation
from a police state."8
According to Garcia's version of the facts, he was well out of the way of the
police officers effecting the arrest of the two Hispanic males and did nothing to interfere
with the arrest. 19 Garcia was at a location open to the public, as he was on a public
thoroughfare. To him, the encounter was newsworthy, as the police officers seemed to be
using excessive force.2 0 Perhaps the officers' perception that they might have been
photographed engaging in police misconduct was what caused them to arrest Garcia. In a
number of respects, the public nature of the location, the photographer's concern for the
person being arrested, the subsequent arrest of the photographer on a discretionary charge,
the failure to convict on the discretionary charge, and the ensuing civil rights lawsuit
against the police officer, Garcia's case is factually similar to Glik v. Cunniffe,2 1 one of the
First Amendment cases reviewed in Section III.
The circumstances of bystander Garcia photographing police officers arresting
individuals and Garcia's subsequent arrest happened in Maryland, an all-party consent
jurisdiction.22 Had Garcia been videotaping the encounter rather than photographing it, he
might have been charged with eavesdropping under the Maryland eavesdropping statutes,
in addition to being arrested for disorderly conduct. The eavesdropping statutes of the
various jurisdictions are discussed in the following section.
II. EAVESDROPPING STATUTES
Federal statutes prohibit eavesdropping and all states but one protect certain types
of conversation from being taped; the highest court of the single state without a statutory
12 Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, Garcia, No. 8:12-cv-03592-JFM.
13 Id. at 2.
14id
'Id
'6 City of Hous., Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987).




19 Complaint, supra note 4, at 5.
20 id
21 655 F.3d 78, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2011). See infra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
22 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1), (c)(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
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prohibition against taping interpreted the state constitution to provide some protection
against eavesdropping.23
Although all states but one protect certain types of conversation against being
recorded, three states, Indiana, New Mexico, and Mississippi, appear not to make
surreptitious taping of a face-to-face conversation a crime. The statutes of Indiana and
New Mexico appear to prohibit taping of telephone conversations but not face-to-face
conversations.24 Although the Mississippi statutes contain procedures for obtaining a court
order to intercept an oral communication,2 5 research has failed to locate any statute or case
law interpretation of any statute affirmatively prohibiting such taping.
Eavesdropping statutes of the various jurisdictions vary widely in the manner in
which they protect face-to-face conversations from being recorded; however, two factors
to consider are the consent required to tape a conversation and the type of conversation
protected. Eavesdropping statutes generally require a police officer not a party to the
conversation to obtain a court order prior to secretly taping a face-to-face conversation.26
Other than obtaining a court order, a conversation may be taped with the consent of at
least one party to the conversation.2 7 A major distinction among the jurisdictions is the
consent required to permit legal recording without a court order; until very recently,
eleven states required all-party consent28 and the federal statutes and the eavesdropping
29statutes from the balance of the states required only one-party consent.
The other factor is the type of conversation that receives statutory protection.
Katz v. United States was the landmark 1967 case that found Fourth Amendment
protection for a telephone conversation.3 0 The case is remembered for Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in which he announced a two-pronged test to determine whether a
conversation would receive constitutional protection against secretly being taped.3 1 The
focus of the test is on the speaker's privacy rather than the substance of the conversation
or the possibility that the conversation may be divulged later. The first prong is that there
must be an expectation of privacy and the second prong is that the expectation of privacy
must be reasonable.32
23 See infra app. A (Vermont).
24 See infra app. A (Indiana & New Mexico).
25 See infra app. A (Mississippi).
26 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2516-2519 (West 2000 & Supp. 2014). The federal eavesdropping statute includes an
exemption allowing a police officer who is a party to the conversation to secretly tape the conversation. Id. §
2511(2)(c). The statute provides: "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of
law to intercept a[n] ... oral .. . communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." Id.
27 See, e.g., Id. § 2511(2)(d). The statute provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a[n] . . . oral . . . communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State.
Id. The eavesdropping statutes of a number of states contain a similar exemption. See infra app. A.
28 See infra notes 34-187 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 188-210 and accompanying text.
30 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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The federal statutes protect face-to-face conversations against recording under
this two-pronged test. Thus, a face-to-face conversation qualifies for protection as an oral
communication against being taped where the speaker had an expectation of privacy that
society would consider reasonable.3 3 Many of the state statutes incorporate the term "oral
communication" and define that term similar to the definition contained in the federal
statutes. The next portion of this paper contains a discussion of all-party consent states,
followed by a discussion of one-party consent jurisdictions.
A. All-Party Consent States
A starting point is to examine the nature of the face-to-face conversation
protected under the eavesdropping statutes of the eleven all-party consent states. The
statutes from the eleven all-party consent states are discussed in this section, as they are
the most problematic for a civilian who desires to tape an encounter with a police officer.
The pertinent provisions of the federal statutes and the statutes of the other states are
reviewed in Appendix A.
Florida,3 4 New Hampshire,3 5 and Pennsylvania3 6 are all-party consent states that
protect a face-to-face conversation as long as there is an expectation of privacy that is
reasonable; thus, other than requiring all-party consent to taping, the way in which they
define the term "oral communication" is similar to the way in which it is defined in the
federal statutes. However, as more fully discussed below, what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy has been interpreted differently by Florida and Pennsylvania.
The Massachusetts eavesdropping statute protects "oral communication" but does
not tie this to whether the speaker has a reasonable expectation of privacy.3 7 What is
important in determining whether the face-to-face conversation is protected is whether the
conversation was secretly taped and whether the taping was done with all-party consent.
Until two recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois
eavesdropping statutes were the most rigid and unforgiving of any of the all-party consent
statutes. Although the statutes protected "oral communication" they did so in such a way
as to specifically negate any exemption for a conversation made with a reasonable
expectation of privacy.3 8
The eavesdropping statutes of Maryland,39 Michigan,4 0 and Washington4 1 protect
"private conversation," California eavesdropping statutes4 2  protect "confidential
communication," and the eavesdropping statutes of Montana43 and Oregon44 protect
"conversation" against being recorded without all party consent. In those states and as
more fully explained below, case law provides some guidance in determining the nature of
the face-to-face conversation protected against eavesdropping.
3 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2014). See infra app. A (United States).
34 See infra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text
3 See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text
38 See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text
3 See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text
40 See infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
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1. A Conversation Made with a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
a. Florida
Florida defines "oral communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation."45 Under Florida law, it is illegal to
deliberately tape a private conversation without all-party consent.46 One who illegally
tapes a conversation is subject to up to five years imprisonment,47 or a fine of up to five
thousand dollars, or both.48
The Florida Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a private home, State v. Walls,49 in a business office
open to the public, State v. Inciarrano,50 and in a police car, State v. Smith.51 While the
Walls and Smith decisions presented little difficulty, Inciarrano highlighted the difficulty
faced by the courts in other states of interpreting the terms "oral communication" and
"intercept."
In Walls, two individuals were allegedly extorting Antel in his home when Antel
secretly taped the conversation.5 2 The Florida Supreme Court found that the conversation
was an oral communication and no statutory exception would allow the taped conversation
to be used as evidence.5 3
In Inciarrano, the victim was in his business office secretly taping the
conversation between the victim and Inciarrano when Inciarrano shot and killed the
victim. Because the taped information was the only evidence against Inciarrano, the
Florida courts faced a tough situation.54 The trial court did not suppress the taped
information, considering "the quasi-public nature of the premises within which the
conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to
bystanders, and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone used to
record the conversations."55 Inciarrano pled nolo contendere but reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The intermediate appellate court reversed,
feeling duty-bound to follow Walls. However, even in reversing, the intermediate court
expressed its uneasiness with the decision it felt it needed to make.56 The court suggested
that the Florida Supreme Court could take one of three avenues of interpretation that
would allow the information secretly taped by the victim to be used against Inciarrano.
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.02(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 255 (End) of the 2014 Sp. "A" Sess. of the Twenty-
Third Legislature).
4 Id. 934.03(1), (2)(d).
47 Id. 775.082(3)(e).
48 Id . 775.083(1).
49 State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1978).
o State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 1985).
' State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 1994).
52 356 So. 2d at 295.
5 Id at 296. Although the court did not state its reasoning, presumably the parties had an expectation of privacy
because there were only three people talking in a confined space and the expectation of privacy was reasonable
because they were in a private home. The court explained that Antel, had he wished, could have obtained
authorization to secretly tape the conversation. Even though Antel had not received the required authorization,
the prosecution could use Antel's testimony as evidence. Id. at 297.
54 Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (Fla.
1985).
* State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1274.
* Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d at 387, 390.
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One route would have been to interpret the term "intercept" to allow a conversant to
secretly tape a conversation but preclude a third party not a party to the conversation from
taping.7 Another route would have been to read the legislative history to protect the
privacy of an "innocent" individual.5 ' The final route would be to limit application of the
exclusionary rule to secret government taping of a conversation.
When Inciarrano reached the Florida Supreme Court, the four-member court
majority stated that Inciarrano's expectation of privacy was not reasonable and quashed
the lower court's decision.60 Without offering more of an explanation why Inciarrano's
expectation of privacy was not reasonable, the court quoted from the intermediate
appellate court decision:
One who enters the business premises of another for a lawful purpose is
an invitee. At the moment that his intention changes, that is, if he suddenly
decides to steal or pillage, or murder, or rape, then at that moment he becomes a
trespasser and has no further right upon the premises.61
Perhaps in indication of the difficulty in reaching a decision in Inciarrano, there
were two concurring opinions, the first authored by one justice and the second, concurring
in result only, joined in by two justices. 6 2 The reasoning of the first concurring opinion is
that Inciarrano did not have an expectation of privacy, as he went into the victim's
business. "[W]hen an individual enters someone else's home or business, he has no
expectation of privacy in what he says or does there, and chapter 934 does not apply."63
The second concurring opinion characterized the majority opinion as a "tortuous
,,64misconstruction of the plain language of the statute. The concurring opinion criticized
the reasoning that the majority borrowed from the intermediate appellate court. "To hold,
as the majority does, that the commission of a criminal act waives a privacy right requires
an entirely new legal definition of privacy rights which would, in turn, shake the
foundation of fourth amendment analysis."6 5 The concurring opinion added, "If criminal
" Id at 388-89.
5 Id at 390.59
id
60 State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1276. In 2000, the intermediate appellate court relied on Inciarrano in
deciding a case in which a part business owner of Balgres Distributing Company, Inc., Lamaletto, secretly taped
a conversation in his office with Jatar who was allegedly attempting to extort Lamaletto. Jatar v. Lamaletto, 758
So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Jatar sued Lamaletto and Balgres civilly, asking for damages for
the taping. The trial court granted Lamaletto and Balgres' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court
affirmed. Id at 1168-69. The intermediate appellate court certified the following question to the Florida Supreme
Court as one of great public importance:
DOES STATE v. WALLS, 356 So.2d 294 (Fla.1978), HAVE CONTINUED VALIDITY
AND BAR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE VICTIM'S FAVOR, WHERE AN
EXTORTION THREAT WAS DELIVERED IN THE VICTIM'S OFFICE AND
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED BY THE VICTIM BECAUSE HE FEARED THAT
SUCH AN EXTORTION THREAT WAS IMMINENT, IN VIEW OF THE HOLDING
INSTATE v. INCIARRANO, 473 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1985)?
Id at 1169-70. The Florida Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Jatar v. Lamaletto, 786 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
2001) (mem.).
6' State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1275-76.
62 
Id. at 1276.
63 Id. (Overton, J., concurring). Justice Overton also recommended that the Florida legislature consider amending
chapter 934. Id
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acts waive privacy rights, as the majority implies, police have the right and duty to intrude
without a warrant into a bedroom where the owner/resident is smoking marijuana,
reasoning that the fourth amendment protection has 'gone up in smoke."'6 6 The author of
the concurring opinion would have adopted one of the suggestions of the intermediate
appellate court and would have interpreted the term "intercept" to allow a conversant to
secretly tape a conversation but preclude a third party not a party to the conversation from
secretly taping a conversation.67 In addition, the opinion recognized the special status of
,,68being in one's own home, which gave Inciarrano's victim a "higher degree of privacy.
In contrast, any expectation of privacy that Inciarrano claimed was not reasonable.69
State v. Smith70 was a typical traffic stop case in which the driver consented to the
officer's request to search the car in which Smith was a passenger. At the officer's
suggestion, the driver and Smith sat in the back seat of the patrol car while their car was
being searched. Unbeknownst to them, the officer secretly taped their conversation, which
contained incriminating information. The suspects were not under arrest while their
conversation was taped but were arrested after the officer found illegal drugs in the car.
The suspects did seem to have a subjective expectation of privacy while in the patrol car,
72as evidenced by their disclosure of incriminating information. Even though this was a
case of first impression for the Florida Supreme Court, the court had several cases of
persuasive authority to rely on and, thus, the decision was a fairly easy one.73 "We agree
with the Eleventh Circuit Court's reasoning and hold that a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car and that any statements intercepted
therein may be admissible as evidence."74 That means that the suspects' conversation did
not fall within the definition of an oral communication and, therefore, the conversation
was not protected against being secretly recorded.
b. New Hampshire
The New Hampshire statutory prohibition against eavesdropping is similar to that
of Florida in a number of respects. New Hampshire defines "oral communication" as "any
verbal communication uttered by a person who has a reasonable expectation that the
communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying such
expectation."76 Under New Hampshire law, it is a class B felony if "without the consent of
all parties to the communication, the person . . . [w]ilfully intercepts . . . any . . . oral
communication" ;77 however, it is "a misdemeanor if, . . . without consent of all parties to
the communication, the person knowingly intercepts a[n] . . . oral communication when
the person is a party to the communication or with the prior consent of one of the parties
to the communication. 78
66 Id
6' Id. at 1276.
68 Id
69 Id at 1276-77.
7o 641 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 1994).
72 id
73 Id. at 852.
74id
7 Id. The court reasoned: "Because we find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car,
section 934.03 does not apply to conversations that take place in those vehicles. Consequently, the section 934.06
prohibition against the use of intercepted oral communications as evidence is inapplicable as well." Id.
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The New Hampshire statute provides two exceptions allowing a police officer to
record a conversation when performing the officer's duties. The first exception makes the
eavesdropping prohibition inapplicable to a police officer recording a traffic stop, in other
words allowing:
A uniformed law enforcement officer to make an audio recording in
conjunction with a video recording of a routine stop performed in the ordinary
course of patrol duties on any way as defined by RSA 259:125 [street or other
thoroughfare], provided that the officer shall first give notification of such
recording to the party to the communication.
The second exception allows an officer to record an incident involving the use of
a taser, in other words making the eavesdropping prohibition inapplicable to:
A law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of the officer's duties
using any device capable of making an audio or video recording, or both, and
which is attached to and used in conjunction with a TASER or other similar
electroshock device. Any person who is the subject of such recording shall be
informed of the existence of the audio or video recording, or both, and shall be
provided with a copy of such recording at his or her request.0
One who illegally tapes a conversation without the consent of at least one party
to the conversation has committed a class B felony, making the individual subject o more
than one year and a maximum of seven years imprisonment, or a maximum fine of $4,000,
or both.1 One who illegally tapes a conversation with the consent of only one party to the
conversation has committed a misdemeanor, punishable as a class B misdemeanor,
making the individual subject to "conditional or unconditional discharge, a [maximum]
fine [of $1,200], or other sanctions"; "[a] fine may be imposed in addition to any sentence
... conditional discharge."82
In contrast to Florida and Pennsylvania, research s owed no case law interpreting
the New Hampshire statutory term "oral communication."8 3
c. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania statutory prohibition against eavesdropping is similar to that of
Florida in a number of respects. Pennsylvania defines "oral communication" as "[a]ny oral
communication uttered by a person possessing an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation."8 4 Similar to
the New Hampshire eavesdropping statute, an exception to the Pennsylvania statute makes





Id. § 625:9.III.(a)(2), 651:2.11, IV.
8
2 Id. § 625:9.IV.(c), 651:2.111, IV.
83 A New Hampshire statute provides an exemption making it lawful for a "law enforcement officer . . . to
intercept a telecommunication or oral communication, when . . . one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception." Id. § 570-A:2.II(d). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has
interpreted the consent requirement under that statute in the context of a face-to-face conversation, State v.
Locke, 761 A.2d 376, 381 (N.H. 1999), and instant messaging, State v. Moscone, 13 A.3d 137, 145 (N.H. 2011);
State v. Lott, 879 A.2d 1167, 1172 (N.H. 2005).
84 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5702 (West 2013).
Id. § 5704(16). The statute provides:
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Under Pennsylvania law, it is a third degree felony if one "intentionally intercepts
... any . . . oral communication;"8 6 however, it is not illegal for "[a] person, to intercept
a[n] . . . oral communication, where all parties to the communication have given prior
consent to such interception."8 7 One convicted of a third degree felony is subject to a
maximum of seven years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $15,000.8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's case law interpretation of the term oral
communication tracks the statutory definition in part, but with a layered approach. The
statutory language directs the court to determine if the conversant had a reasonable
expectation that the conversation would not be intercepted, which interception, in most
instances, means that the conversation would not be recorded; however, according to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Agnew v. Dupler, the non-interception determination is
dependent on a determination that the conversant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. This approach asks a court to first consider whether there was a reasonable
A law enforcement officer, whether or not certified under section 5724 (relating to
training), acting in the performance of his official duties to intercept and record an oral
communication between individuals in accordance with the following:
(i) At the time of the interception, the oral communication does not occur inside the
residence of any of the individuals.
(ii) At the time of the interception, the law enforcement officer:
(A) is in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as a law enforcement officer;
(B) is in close proximity to the individuals' oral communication;
(C) is using an electronic, mechanical or other device which has been approved under
section 5706(b)(4) (relating to exceptions to prohibitions in possession, sale, distribution,
manufacture or advertisement of electronic, mechanical or other devices) to intercept the
oral communication; and
(D) informs, as soon as reasonably practicable, the individuals identifiably present that he




Id. §§ 106(b)(4), 1101, 1103.
89 Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523 (Pa. 1998). As the court explained:
[I]n determining what constitutes an "oral communication" under the Wiretap Act, the
proper inquiries are whether the speaker had a specific expectation that the contents of the
discussion would not be intercepted, and whether that expectation was justifiable under the
existing circumstances. In determining whether the expectation of non-interception was
justified under the circumstances of a particular case, it is necessary for a reviewing court
to examine the expectation in accordance with the principles surrounding the right to
privacy, for one cannot have an expectation of non-interception absent a finding of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. To determine the existence of an expectation of privacy
in one's activities, a reviewing court must first examine whether the person exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and second, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.
Id.
A 1996 case involved a police officer who secretly taped traffic stops. Commonwealthv. McIvor, 670 A.2d 697,
698 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). In contrast to the analysis of Agnew, the McIvor court found no linkage between a
reasonable expectation of non-interception and a reasonable expectation of privacy. "Under the circumstances of
this case, while the stopped motorists had no expectation of privacy, they had a very real expectation of non-
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expectation of privacy prior to considering whether the expectation that the conversation
would not be recorded was reasonable. This two-step approach, unique to the state, may
well be because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized an implicit right to
privacy under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the state's version of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.0
This interpretation asks a court to make two determinations, one about privacy
and the other about non-interception, both of which have a subjective and an objective
component. Case law focus is often on the reasonableness of the speaker's expectation of
privacy because the reasonable expectation of non-interception finding is necessarily
dependent on a reasonable expectation of privacy finding.91 As for the subjective
component, the conversant naturally claims an expectation of privacy and an expectation
that the conversation was not being recorded. Thus, the key to the court's decision is the
objective component of whether society would view the speaker's expectation of privacy
as reasonable.9 2
The reasonableness objective component is often based on the location of the
conversation and the identities or positions of the parties to the conversation. In 1998 in
Agnew v. Dupler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a police officer did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a squadroom in the police department where the
police officer was talking to two other police officers and the chief of police was
eavesdropping on the conversation via intercom.93 The squadroom was large and the door
was open, allowing others outside the room to overhear conversations in the room without
amplification, and the intercom on the room's four telephones, which could be activated at
any time, permitted conversations in the room to be heard in other locations within the
building.9 4
In the 1994 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Commonwealth v. Brion, a
confidential informant with a body wire entered Brion's home to make an illegal drug
interception. They legitimately could expect that their words would not be electronically seized and carried away
by the officer." Id. at 704. The court then found that the secretly taped conversations were oral communication.
Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review of the case on appeal. Commonwealth v. McIvor, 692 A.2d
564 (Pa. 1997) (mem.).
The continued viability of McIvor seems doubtful, given Agnew. In addition, a police officer can easily tape a
traffic stop in compliance with § 5704(16) quoted above, which was adopted in 2002.
90 Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81, 87 (Pa. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 494 U.S. 299 (1990)
("Article I, § 8 creates an implicit right to privacy in this Commonwealth.... To determine whether one's
activities fall within the right of privacy, we must examine: first, whether appellant has exhibited an expectation
of privacy; and second, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable").
Another reason for making the non-interception dependent on a determination of a reasonable expectation of
privacy may be to refute the reasoning of McIvor. The concurring opinion of Agnew would have separated the
finding of interception from the finding of privacy. "Contrary to the Majority's position, I believe that the
expectation of non-interception and the expectation of privacy involve two distinct inquiries. Thus, a speaker,
under certain circumstances, may possess a reasonable expectation of non-interception even in the absence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy." Agnew, 717 A.2d at 525 (Nigro, J., concurring).
91 In determinig whether the speaker has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the subjective component is
whether the speaker expects privacy, and the objective component is whether society would consider this
expectation reasonable. In determinig whether there is a reasonable expectation of non-interception, the
subjective component is whether the speaker expects that the conversation will not be recorded, and the objective
component is whether society would consider this expectation reasonable. Agnew, 717 A.2d at 523.
92 Id. "Since the standard for such expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable, the standard is necessarily an objective standard and not a subjective standard . . . ." Id. The
determination of the reasonableness of the conversant's expectation of privacy is like a house of cards; with this
objective component of reasonableness missing, the house of cards collapses.
93
Id. at 521, 524.
94 Id. at 524.
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purchase and the informant taped the conversation.95 The court found that the recording
violated Brion's right to privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution and held that "an
individual can reasonably expect that his right to privacy will not be violated in his home
through the use of any electronic surveillance."9 6
In a 1989 case, Commonwealth v. Henlen, a Pennsylvania state trooper was
questioning a prison guard regarding the theft of an inmate's personal property.97
Unbeknownst to the trooper, the guard was secretly taping the conversation, which
conversation was being conducted at the county jail.9 " The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that "the circumstances do not establish that Trooper Dibler possessed a justifiable
expectation that his words would not be subject to interception."99 Questioning of suspects
is usually recorded, the trooper took notes of the questioning, which were to be made part
of a report, and there was a third person present during part of the questioning.00
Thus, although the definition of "oral communication" in the statutes of the three
states, Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, is almost identical in wording, the
interpretation of that term by two states is differs significantly. New Hampshire has not
had occasion to interpret the meaning of oral communication. Florida and Pennsylvania
have each decided a number of cases interpreting the meaning of the term.
Under Florida case law, a court would first consider the threshold issue of
whether the subject conversation qualifies as an oral communication. Florida has
interpreted the two prongs of the definition as being given equal weight. Thus, if either the
speaker did not have an expectation of privacy or if the expectation of privacy was not
reasonable, then Florida would find no protected oral communication. In Walls, the
Florida Supreme Court easily found that the conversation qualified as an oral
communication because the conversation took place in a private home. In both Inciarrano
and Smith, the Florida Supreme Court found that the objective prong of the two-prong test
lacking and, therefore, tape recording did not violate the Florida eavesdropping statute.
Once it has been determined that the taped conversation qualifies as an oral
communication, the court would move on to consider whether there was an eavesdropping
violation because all parties to the conversation failed to consent.
In examining whether the taped conversation was private, Pennsylvania case law
emphasizes the objective prong of the two-pronged test and assumes that the subjective
prong of the test was met. Thus, it was reasonable for Brion to have an expectation of
privacy in his home but it was not reasonable for there to be an expectation of privacy in a
squadroom, as in Agnew, or during an interview that took place in a county jail, as in
Henlen.
2. A Conversation that is Secretly Taped - Massachusetts
After reviewing the eavesdropping statutes of Florida, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania, one should not necessarily expect the same two-pronged approach to apply
to a state statute that protects a face-to-face conversation under the term "oral
652 A.2d 287, 287 (Pa. 1994).
9 Id at 289.
9 564 A.2d 905, 905 (Pa. 1989).
98 Id
99 Id at 907.
.00 Id at 906.
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communication." As more fully explained below, the key to the Massachusetts
eavesdropping statute is whether the person who recorded the conversation did so secretly.
In Massachusetts,
... any person who--willfully commits an interception .. . of any . .. oral
communication shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or
imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five years, or
imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and
one half years, or both so fined and given one such imprisonment.101
Pursuant to the statute, "'interception' means to . . . secretly record . . . the
contents of any . . . oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by any
person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such communication."102
The statute further defines "oral communication" as "speech, except such speech as is
transmitted over the public air waves by radio or other similar device."1 03
In a 2001 case, Commonwealth v. Hyde, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute "strictly prohibits the
secret electronic recording by a private individual of any oral communication, and makes
no exception for a motorist who, having been stopped by police officers, surreptitiously
tape records the encounter."104 The four police officers involved did not discover that
Hyde, the driver, had secretly taped the fifteen to twenty minute stop, which was
"confrontational" until Hyde went to the police department to file a complaint.10 5 The
police department requested that Hyde be charged with four counts of eavesdropping and
Hyde was convicted of the charges. 106
On appeal, Hyde argued that he could not be convicted because the officers did
not have an expectation of privacy, reasoning that the term "oral communication" should
be interpreted to require an expectation of privacy.107 The four-member majority of the
court declined to so interpret the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute in light of the
statute's "plain language and legislative history," explaining that Hyde could have
recorded the encounter had he "simply informed the police of his intention to tape record
the encounter, or even held the tape recorder in plain sight."108
The two justices joining in the vigorous dissent would have read the
Massachusetts tatute to prohibit recording only of a conversation made with "a legitimate
expectation of privacy."109 The dissent emphasized the vital role that the public has in
monitoring police activity. "To hold that the Legislature intended to allow police officers
to conceal possible misconduct behind a cloak of privacy requires a more affirmative
showing than this statute allows."110 Finally, the dissent noted the flawed nature of the
101 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 C.L (West 2014)
102 Id. 99 B.4.
10 Id. 99 B.2.
104 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001).
105 Id. at 964-65.
.' Id. at 965.
107 Id. at 965-66.
.os Id. at 971.
109 Id. at 975 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 976. "It is the recognition of the potential for abuse of power that has caused our society, and law
enforcement leadership, to insist that citizens have the right to demand the most of those who hold such awesome
powers." Id. at 977.
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statute because it does not distinguish between a private individual and a reporter
exercising the reporter's right under the First Amendment to Freedom of the Press and
would subject both individuals to criminal liability."
The dissenting opinion in Hyde makes it clear that not only face-to-face
conversations made with a reasonable expectation of privacy are protected against being
recorded. The Massachusetts interpretation f the state's eavesdropping statute focused on
the autonomy of the individual in consenting or not consenting to being recorded. Still, a
determination whether the taping was done secretly may be fact specific to a particular
case and may be dependent on whether the speaker recognizes that a device in plain view
has the capability of taping.
3. Taping a Conversation Where There is no Claim of a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy - Illinois
Until two 2014 Illinois Supreme Court decisions, Illinois law protected "any oral
communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the
parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances
justifying that expectation."1 2 An individual eavesdropped when the individual
"[k]nowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or
recording all or any part of any conversation . .. unless he does so . . . with the consent of
all of the parties to such conversation or electronic communication."ll3 The statutory
language specifically negated limiting conversations protected against recording to those
made with a reasonable expectation of privacy; thus, it would have been an offense to tape
a conversation even in a public place or in the midst of a crowd of people.1 14 Among a
lengthy string of exemptions, were two that allowed an officer to tape a conversation
relating to a traffic stop while suspects were in a patrol car.1
Eavesdropping was a class 4 felony11 6 unless the person recorded was a law
enforcement officer or other official, in which event eavesdropping was a class 1
felony.1 17 One convicted of a class 4 felony was subject to imprisonment of not less than
one to not more than three years and a fine of a maximum of $25,000.11" One convicted of
a class 1 felony was subject to imprisonment of not less than four to not more than fifteen
years and a fine of a maximum of $25,000.119
In 2014 in People v. Clark1 20 and People v. Melongo,12 1 two cases decided on the
same day, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the unforgiving nature of the Illinois
statute that protected face-to-face conversations even if there was no reasonable
"1 Id.
112 720 ILL. COW. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1(d) (West 2003).
113 Id. 5/14-2(a)(1).
114id
115 Id 5/14-3(h), (h-5).
... Id. 5/14-4(a). "Eavesdropping, for a first offense, is a Class 4 felony and, for a second or subsequent offense,
is a Class 3 felony." Id.
". Id 5/14-4(b).
118 730 ILL. COW. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-45(a), 5/5-4.5-50(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-756 of the 2014
Reg. Sess.).
119 Id. 5/5-4.5-30(a), 5/5-4.5-50(b).
120 People v. Clark, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014). Clark was charged with secretly taping a conversation with an
attorney and secretly taping a conversation with a judge and an attorney. Id. at 156.
121 People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014). Melongo was charged with secretly taping three telephone
conversations with the Assistant Administrator of the Cook County Court Reporter's Office, Criminal Division,
and illegally posting the recordings and a transcript of the recordings on her website. Id. at 122-23.
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expectation of privacy and held the recording statute to be unconstitutional on its face.1 2 2
The court found the statute problematic for several reasons. First of all, the
statute "criminalize[d] a wide range of innocent conduct."l23 The court explained, "[t]he
statute criminalizes the recording of conversations that cannot be deemed private: a loud
argument on the street, a political debate on a college quad, yelling fans at an athletic
event, or any conversation loud enough that the speakers should expect to be heard by
others."1 24 A second reason for concern is that one who openly tapes a conversation with
the recording device in plain view might have been charged under the statute unless the
person taping had the express consent of all parties to the conversation. "[T]he individual
must risk being charged with a violation of the statute and hope that the trier of fact will
find implied consent."1 25 In addition, the court recognized the value of an eavesdropping
statute in protecting conversations that are truly private from being surreptitiously taped;
otherwise, the possibility of an intimate conversation being taped might have a chilling
effect. 126
Thus, with two Illinois Supreme Court decisions, Illinois has moved from rigidly
protecting conversations against being taped to presently providing no protection. The
Illinois legislature will have the task of fashioning a new eavesdropping statute.
4. Taping a Private Conversation
Maryland, Michigan, and Washington prohibit taping a "private conversation"
without all-party consent.
a. Maryland
Maryland makes it illegal to tape "any person in private conversation" unless
"the person is a party to the communication and where all of the parties to the
communication have given prior consent."1 27 One who illegally tapes a conversation is
subject to up to five years imprisonment, or up to ten thousand dollars in fine, or both.128
An exception to a Maryland statute allows a police officer to record a traffic stop subject
to certain conditions. 129
122 Clark, 6 N.E.3d at 162 ("[S]ection [5/14-2](a)(1)(A) of the eavesdropping statute is unconstitutional as
violative of the overbreadth doctrine under the first amendment o the United States Constitution."); Melongo, 6
N.E.3d at 127 ("[T]he recording provision is unconstitutional on its face because a substantial number of its
applications violate the first amendment.").
123 Melongo, 6 N.E.3d at 126.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Clark, 6 N.E.3d at 160-61.
127 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401(13)(i), (3), 10-402(a)(1), (c)(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
128 Id. § 10-402(b).
129 Id. § 10-402(c)(4). The statute provides:
(i) It is lawful under this subtitle for a law enforcement officer in the course of the officer's
regular duty to intercept an oral communication if:
1. The law enforcement officer initially lawfully detained a vehicle during a criminal
investigation or for a traffic violation;
2. The law enforcement officer is a party to the oral communication;
3. The law enforcement officer has been identified as a law enforcement officer to the
other parties to the oral communication prior to any interception;
4. The law enforcement officer informs all other parties to the communication of the
interception at the beginning of the communication; and
5. The oral interception is being made as part of a video tape recording.
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The Maryland term "private conversation" is not defined by statute. In 1997, a
Maryland court analyzed whether a conversation qualified as an oral communication by
determining whether the conversation was made with a reasonable expectation of
privacy.130 In so doing, the court employed the two-pronged Katz test of "whether Craigie
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy with regard to his statements. If we
answer that question in the affirmative, we then ask whether that expectation is 'one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"'l31
b. Michigan
Michigan statutes define "eavesdropping" as "to overhear, record, amplify or
transmit" the "private discourse of others without the permission of all persons engaged in
the discourse."1 32 It is illegal for "[a]ny person who is present or who is not present" to
eavesdrop on a "private conversation," with one who illegally eavesdrops subject to up to
two years imprisonment, or a fine of up to two thousand dollars, or both. 133 In contrast to
the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes in most other states, the Michigan statutes do
not distinguish between eavesdropping on a face-to-face conversation and wiretapping a
telephone conversation, with the terms "private discourse of others" and "private
conversation" applying to both types of conversations.
In 2001 in People v. Stone, the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted a private
conversation to be "a conversation that a person reasonably expects to be free from casual
,,134or hostile intrusion or surveillance". Although Stone involved a cordless telephone
conversation, the court's interpretation in Stone coincides with its decision in Dickerson v.
Raphael,135 which involved the recording of a face-to-face conversation.136
In Dickerson, the Michigan Court of Appeals had held that, where one of the
participants in the conversation was wearing a concealed microphone, a non-participant
who was taping the conversation could be liable for eavesdropping.137 In reversing in part,
the Michigan Supreme Court found that the intermediate appellate court had improperly
granted a directed verdict in favor of the participant whose conversation had been secretly
broadcast because the lower court had not first determined whether the conversation was
private.138 The Michigan Supreme Court stated, "the question whether plaintiffs
conversation was private depends on whether she intended and reasonably expected it to
(ii) If all of the requirements of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph are met, an interception
is lawful even if a person becomes a party to the communication following:
1. The identification required under subparagraph (i)3 of this paragraph; or
2. The informing of the parties required under subparagraph (i)4 of this paragraph.
Id
130 Malpas v. State, 695 A.2d 588, 595 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
131 Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The court found that
Craigie did not have an expectation of privacy because, on his side of the telephone conversation, he was yelling
loud enough to be heard in the next apartment. Id at 591, 595.
132 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539a(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2014, No. 280, of the 2014 Reg. Sess.,
97th Legislature).
133 Id § 750.539c.
134 People v. Stone, 621 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Mich. 2001).
135 Dickersonv. Raphael, 601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich. 1999).
13' Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd in part, 601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich.
1999).
137 Id at 88.
138 601 N.W.2d at 108.
2015] 77
17
Bast: Tipping the Scale in Favor Civilian Taping of Encounters with Pol
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
be private at the time and under the circumstances involved."1 39 The trial court had
mistakenly focused on the substance of the conversation rather than the speaker's
reasonable expectation of privacy. "The proper question is whether plaintiff intended and
reasonably expected that the conversation was private, not whether the subject matter was
intended to be private." 4 0
In 2011 in Bowens v. Ary, Inc.,141 the Michigan Supreme Court applied language
from Stone when finding that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy based on the following facts:
(1) the general locale of the meeting was the backstage of the Joe Louis
arena during the hectic hours preceding a high-profile concert, where over 400
people, including national and local media, had backstage passes; (2) the concert-
promoter defendants were not receptive to the public-official plaintiffs' requests
and, by all accounts, the parties' relationship was antagonistic; (3) the room in
which plaintiffs chose to converse served as defendants' operational headquarters
with security personnel connected to defendants controlling the open doors; (4)
there were at least nine identified people in the room, plus unidentified others
who were free to come and go from the room, and listen to the conversation, as
they pleased; (5) plaintiffs were aware that there were multiple camera crews in
the vicinity, including a crew from MTV and a crew specifically hired by
defendants to record backstage matters of interest; (6) and video evidence shows
one person visibly filming in the room where the conversation took place while
plaintiffs were present, thereby establishing that at least one cameraman was
openly and obviously filming during the course of what plaintiffs have
characterized as a "private conversation. 142
An interesting question in Michigan is whether a participant can tape a
conversation without running afoul of the prohibition against eavesdropping even though
the all-party consent requirement would be applicable if a bystander were to tape the
conversation. In 1982 in Sullivan v. Gray, the Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted that
statute to allow taping by one of the parties to a telephone conversation.143 "The statute
contemplates that a potential eavesdropper must be a third party not otherwise involved in
the conversation being eavesdropped on."144 The Michigan Supreme Court did not weigh
in on this interpretation, denying review in Sullivan,145 nor in Dickerson did the Michigan
Supreme Court comment on whether there was an exception for a participant recording the
conversation. 146
c. Washington
Washington makes it illegal to tape "any ... [p]rivate conversation . . . without
first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation."1 47 One who
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 794 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 2011).
142 Id. at 843-44.
143 324 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
144 Id.
145 Sullivanv. Gray, 335 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. 1983) (mem.).
14' Dickersonv. Raphael, 601 N.W.2d 108, 108 (Mich. 1999).
147 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation). The statute specifies how
all party consent may be demonstrated:
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illegally tapes a private conversation has committed a gross misdemeanor1 48 and is subject
to up to three hundred sixty four days imprisonment, or up to five thousand dollars in fine,
or both.1 4 9 Under the state eavesdropping statutes, a police officer who uses the patrol car
video to tape a conversation must specifically inform civilians that the conversation is
being recorded. 150
The term "private conversation" has no statutory definition; however, the term
has been subject to case law interpretation. The Washington Supreme Court found that a
traffic stop conversation is not private.151 The court also found that "conversations with
police officers are not private." 52
In other circumstances, the court has interpreted the term to first require that the
parties to the conversation have a subjective expectation of privacy and that the court
consider three other factors in determining whether the taped conversation is a private
conversation within the meaning of the statute.153 In a 2006 case, Lewis v. State, Dept. of
Licensing, the Washington Supreme Court stated that the three factors are: "(1) duration
and subject matter of the conversation, (2) location of conversation and presence or
Where consent by all parties is needed pursuant to this chapter, consent shall be
considered obtained whenever one party has announced to all other parties engaged in the
communication or conversation, in any reasonably effective manner, that such
communication or conversation is about to be recorded or transmitted: PROVIDED, That
if the conversation is to be recorded that said announcement shall also be recorded.
Id § 9.73.030(3).
148 Id . 9.73.080(1).
149 Id . 9.92.020.
15o Id 9.73.090(1)(c). The statute exempts "[s]ound recordings that correspond to video images recorded by
video cameras mounted in law enforcement vehicles" from the reach of the eavesdropping prohibition. Id.
However, there are several conditions that a police officer must abide by when making the recording. The statute
provides:
All law enforcement officers wearing a sound recording device that makes recordings
corresponding to videos recorded by video cameras mounted in law enforcement vehicles
must be in uniform. A sound recording device that makes a recording pursuant to this
subsection (1)(c) must be operated simultaneously with the video camera when the
operating system has been activated for an event. No sound recording device may be
intentionally turned off by the law enforcement officer during the recording of an event.
Once the event has been captured, the officer may turn off the audio recording and place
the system back into "pre-event" mode.
A law enforcement officer shall inform any person being recorded by sound under this
subsection (1)(c) that a sound recording is being made and the statement so informing the
person shall be included in the sound recording, except that the law enforcement officer is
not required to inform the person being recorded if the person is being recorded under
exigent circumstances. A law enforcement officer is not required to inform a person being
recorded by video under this subsection (1)(c) that the person is being recorded by video.
Id
I Lewis v. State, Dep't of Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1086 (Wash. 2006). In Lewis, the Washington Supreme
Court held that "traffic stop conversations are not private." Id. the court further held that "the language of RCW
9.73.090(1)(c) directs officers to inform all traffic stop detainees that they are being recorded, not just those
having private conversations. Therefore, we conclude that police officers must strictly comply with RCW
9.73.090(1)(c), even though recording those traffic stop conversations does not also violate RCW 9.73.030." Id.
152 Id at 1084.
153 Id. at 1083.
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potential presence of a third party, and (3) role of the nonconsenting party and his or her
relationship to the consenting party." 54
In Lewis, the court considered four consolidated cases in which police officers
had stopped drivers for alleged DUI offenses and the officers had taped the
conversations.155 In considering the three factors, the court easily concluded that the
conversations were not private;1 5 6 however, the court excluded the use of the taped
conversation in each of the three cases in which the police officer failed to inform the
driver that the conversation was being taped.157
In the 2014 case State v. Kipp, the Washington Supreme Court considered the
three factors in deciding that the conversation was private.s15  Kipp engaged in a ten-
minute conversation with his brother-in-law about a sensitive subject when they were
alone in a private home.159
Thus, although Maryland, Michigan, and Washington all protect face-to-face
conversations under the term "private conversation," the case law interpretation of the
term differs from state to state. In addition, Michigan may allow participant taping as an
exception to all-party consent.
5. Taping a Confidential Communication - California
In California, it is illegal to tape a "confidential communication ... without the
consent of all parties."l60 A "confidential communication" is defined as:
[A]ny communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably
indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the
parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in
any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the
public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication
may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.16 1
154 Id. The court first identified the three factors in 1996. State v. Clark, 916 P.2d 384, 392-93 (Wash. 1996). In
that case, the court provides analysis, perhaps instructive, of whether the three factors apply in a number of
situations. Id.
. 139 P.3d at 1079.
. Id. at 1084.
Under the first factor, the recorded conversations in these cases were essentially brief
business conversations with uniformed police officers. Under the second factor, the
conversations between the police officers and the detainees occurred in public, in several
cases along busy roads. Additionally, in the case of Lewis and Kelly, third parties were
present for part or all of the conversations because the police officers called back-up, and
in the case of Kelly, a passenger was in his car. Finally, under the third factor, it is not
persuasive that the nonconsenting parties to these conversations, the drivers, would expect
the officers to keep their conversations secret, when the drivers would reasonably expect
that the officers would file reports and potentially would testify at hearings about the
incidents.
Id. at 1083.
. Id. at 1090.
158 317 P.3d 1029, 103 5-36 (Wash. 2014).
159 Id. at 1034-35.
1.o CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 187 of 2014 Reg. Sess.,
Res. Ch. 1 of 2013-2014 2nd Ex. Sess., and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot).
.. Id. § 632(c).
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The California Supreme Court found that "a conversation is confidential under
section 632 if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that
the conversation is not being overheard or recorded."l62 One who illegally tapes a
conversation is subject to up to one year imprisonment, or a fine of up to two thousand
five hundred dollars, or both. 163
Thus, California employs the Katz two-pronged test to determine if a face-to-face
conversation qualifies for protection as a "confidential communication."
6. Protection Against Taping a Conversation
a. Montana
Montana makes it illegal to secretly record a conversation without all party
consent. 164 Under the Montana statute, one "commits the offense of violating privacy in
communications if the person knowingly or purposely . . . records . . . a conversation by
use of a hidden electronic or mechanical device that reproduces a human conversation
without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation."1 65 The statute exempts from
criminal sanction "elected or appointed public officials or ... public employees when the .
,,166recording is done in the performance of official duty. This exception would allow a
uniformed police officer to secretly record a conversation with a suspect.167 One who
illegally tapes a conversation is subject to up to six months imprisonment, or up to five
hundred dollars in fine, or both. 168
162 Flanagan v. Flanagan, 41 P.3d 575, 582 (Cal. 2002). Flanagan involved the secret taping of telephone
conversations; however, pursuant to statutory language the term "confidential communication" is not limited to
face-to-face conversation. Section 632(a) provides:
Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential
communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops
upon or records the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on
among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or
other device, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500), or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in
the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
§ 632(a). As evidence of the inclusive nature of the term, in Flanagan the California Supreme Court cited with
approval to a case involving a face-to-face conversation. 41 P.3d at 581 (citing Shulmanv. Grp. W Prods., Inc.,
955 P.2d 469, 492 (Cal. 1998) (finding that the recording is illegal if one has "an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the conversation)).
163 § 632(a).
164 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1) (West 2009), invalidated on other grounds by State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755
(Mont. 2013).
16' Id. Secret recording is not illegal in circumstances in which either "persons [are] speaking at public meetings"
or "persons [are] given warning of the . . . recording, and if one person provides the warning, either party may
record." Id. § 45-8-213(1)(c).
166 Id.
1'6 However, the Montana Constitution may prohibit secret taping by a police infonnant. The Montana
Constitution contains a right to privacy and a right against unreasonable search and seizure. See MONT. CONST.
art. I, §§ 10, 11. In a 2008 decision, the Montana Supreme Court held that "recording of the Defendants'
conversations with the confidential informants, notwithstanding the consent of the confidential informants,
constituted searches subject to the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution."
State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 504 (Mont. 2008). The court further found that "recording of those conversations
without a warrant or the existence of an established exception to the warrant requirement violated the




Bast: Tipping the Scale in Favor Civilian Taping of Encounters with Pol
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
In addition to the eavesdropping statute, Article 2, § 10 of the Montana
Constitution guarantees Montana citizens a right to privacy: "The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without
the showing of a compelling state interest."1 69
The eavesdropping statute does not define the term "conversation" and research
fails to show that the term has been interpreted by the Montana state courts. However, two
Supreme Court of Montana cases have interpreted the Montana Constitution privacy
provision to protect certain conversations against being secretly taped.
In 2008 in State v. Goetz, the court considered two consolidated cases in which
police confidential informants had been fitted with body wires and secretly taped
conversations with the two suspects, with two of the conversations taking place in the
suspects' residences and one conversation taking place in the informant's vehicle located
in a parking lot.170 In determining if the suspect had a right to privacy, the court
considered "1) whether the person challenging the state's action has an actual subjective
expectation of privacy; [and] 2) whether society is willing to recognize that subjective
expectation as objectively reasonable."17 1 The court found that the suspects did have
"actual subjective expectations of privacy" because of the "private settings"1 72 and that
"society is willing to recognize as reasonable the expectation that conversations held in a
private setting are not surreptitiously being electronically monitored and recorded by
government agents."1 73
In 2010 in State v. Meredith, police officers secretly taped Meredith's allegedly
incriminating statements while he sat alone in a police station interrogation room.17 4 The
Supreme Court of Montana used the two-pronged test from Goetz and concluded that
"while Meredith may have an expectation of privacy in his statements, it is not one that
society would recognize as objectively reasonable."7 The court reasoned that "[h]ad
[Meredith] wanted to preserve his privacy, he would not have voiced his thoughts."1 76
b. Oregon
The Oregon statute provides that one "may not . .. [o]btain ... the whole or any
part of a conversation by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether
electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, if not all participants in the conversation are
169 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
17o Goetz, 191 P.3d at 492-93.
171 Id. at 497.
172 Id. at 499. "The [suspects] did not conduct their conversations where other individuals were present or
physically within range to overhear the conversations." Id. at 498.
173 Id. at 500. An open question is whether the court would have reached the same two conclusions if the person
secretly taping had been a private individual. The court stated:
[W]hile we recognize that Montanans are willing to risk that a person with whom they are
conversing in their home or other private setting may repeat that conversation to a third
person, we are firmly persuaded that they are unwilling to accept as reasonable that the
same conversation is being electronically monitored and recorded by government agents
without their knowledge.
Id
174 226 P.3d 571, 575, 580 (Mont. 2010).
1 Id. at 580.
17 Id. "Police interrogation rooms are traditionally areas where people are watched and monitored in some form
or fashion whether it be by two-way glass, video taping or audio recording. In addition, there was no reason for
Meredith to make the incriminating statements out loud unless he wanted to be overheard." Id.
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specifically informed that their conversation is being obtained.""' The term
"conversation" is defined as "the transmission between two or more persons of an oral
communication which is not a telecommunication or a radio communication."" The
Oregon eavesdropping statutes are in some respects similar to those of Illinois in that
Oregon requires all party consent and does not limit protected conversations to those made
with an expectation of privacy considered to be reasonable. Research of Oregon case
law reveals no case that read a reasonable expectation of privacy requirement into a
protected conversation. Illegal eavesdropping is a class A misdemeanor,1 0 carrying a
maximum one year prison term" and a maximum fine of six thousand two hundred fifty
dollars. 182
Surprisingly enough, the words "specifically informed" were the focus of two
Oregon Court of Appeals cases, one from 1990 and the second from 2011, decided en
banc. 18 3 In the 1990 case, Bichsel's conviction for recording her in-person conversation
with at least two officers and her companion was affirmed because she failed to tell the
officers that she was recording the conversation.18 4 In the 2011 case, a police officer
pulled over Neff for a traffic stop and told Neff that the officer was recording the
conversation; the officer did not know that Neff was also recording the conversation from
his driver's position with a recorder not in view of the officer. 1 The court held that
officer "Ou's own act of informing defendant hat their conversation was being recorded
was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 165.540(l)(c) that all participants to the
conversation be 'specifically informed' that the conversation was being obtained."1 8 6
177 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. legislation effective through July
1, 2014).
178 Id. § 165.535(1).
179 The statute does except from the reach of the prohibition against recording, face-to-face conversations made
in certain specified settings so long as the tape recorder is not hidden. Id. § 165.540(6). The statute provides:
The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of this section do not apply to persons who intercept
or attempt to intercept with an unconcealed recording device the oral communications that
are part of any of the following proceedings:
(a) Public or semipublic meetings such as hearings before governmental or quasi-
governmental bodies, trials, press conferences, public speeches, rallies and sporting or
other events;
(b) Regularly scheduled classes or similar educational activities in public or private
institutions; or
(c) Private meetings or conferences if all others involved knew or reasonably should have





183 See State v. Bichsel, 790 P.2d 1142 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (en banc); State v. Neff, 265 P.3d 62 (Or. Ct. App.
2011) (en banc).
184 Bichsel, 790 P.2d at 1143. Bichsel had been counseling young people at a local mall and was carrying a tape
recorder that continued to record when she and a companion met up with at least two police officers in an alley
of downtown Eugene. One of the officers arrested Bichsel when the officer discovered that their conversation
had been recorded. Id. The court opined that, even if the recorder was in plain sight, as Bichsel claimed, the
statute required her to tell the officers that she was taping the conversation. Id. at 1144-45.
185 Neff 265 P.3d at 63.
18. Id. at 68. The court found that "the primary concern underlying ORS 165.540(1)(c) was the protection of
participants in conversations from being recorded without their knowledge." Id. at 66. The court reasoned that
"[w]here, as here, all participants in a conversation know that the conversation is being recorded, the legislature's
primary concern has been satisfied." Id.
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Similar to the New Hampshire eavesdropping statute, the Oregon statute provides two
exceptions allowing a police officer to record a conversation when performing the
officer's duties. 1s7
Although the eavesdropping statutes of Montana and Oregon protect face-to-face
conversations, the focus of the two states is quite different. Montana uses the Katz two-
pronged test to gauge the speaker's privacy. Oregon is more akin to Massachusetts in
Oregon's focus on the autonomy of the speaker in consenting or not consenting to being
taped.
7. One-Party Consent States
The federal eavesdropping statutes prohibit taping a conversation that qualifies as
an oral communication.88 In defining the term oral communication, the federal statutes
incorporate the Katz two-pronged reasonable expectation of privacy test. Thus, an oral
communication is a conversation in which the speaker has an expectation of privacy that
society would consider to be reasonable. The first prong is the subjective component of
the test and the second prong is the objective component of the test.1"9 One of the
exemptions from liability under the federal statutes allows a private individual to tape a
conversation if the person is a party to the conversation or one of the parties to the
conversation consents to the taping unless the taping is for a criminal or tortious
purpose.190 This exemption makes the federal eavesdropping statutes one-party consent
statutes.
Although the federal statutes allow a conversation to be taped upon one-party
consent, it would be illegal for someone who is not a party to the conversation to tape the
conversation so long as the participants expect privacy in the conversation and society
would consider that expectation of privacy to be reasonable.191 Typically, people
discussing confidential, sensitive, or intimate information expect privacy; therefore, the
subjective component of the test is usually satisfied. The second prong of the test, the
objective component, is usually fact specific and is often tied to location and the
possibility that the conversation might be overheard. A reasonable expectation of privacy
is often recognized in a private home, but not in a public park or on a public street.
However, there may not be a reasonable expectation of privacy in a private home if the
doors or windows were open or the parties to the conversation were speaking loud enough
to be heard outside the home1 92 and there might be a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
187 The first exception allows a police officer to record a traffic stop, in other words making the eavesdropping
prohibition inapplicable to:
A law enforcement officer who is in uniform and displaying a badge and who is operating
a vehicle-mounted video camera that records the scene in front of, within or surrounding a
police vehicle, unless the officer has reasonable opportunity to inform participants in the
conversation that the conversation is being obtained.
§ 165.540(5)(c). The second exception allows an officer to record an incident involving the use of a taser, in
other words making the eavesdropping prohibition inapplicable to: "A law enforcement officer who, acting in the
officer's official capacity, deploys an Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology device that contains a built-in
monitoring system capable of recording audio or video, for the duration of that deployment." Id. § 165.540(5)(d).
188 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 (West 2000 & Supp. 2014).
189 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g. Malpas v. State, 695 A.2d 588, 595 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); People v. Kirsh, 575 N.Y.S.2d 306,
307 (App. Div. 1991). The Malpas court found that Craigie did not have an expectation of privacy because, on
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park if the conversation is being conducted in a low tone of voice and the parties to the
conversation are far removed from others in the park.193
The federal eavesdropping statutes have been quite influential and serve as a
model for many states adopting their own eavesdropping statutes. The eavesdropping
statutes of a number of states track the above provisions of the federal eavesdropping
statutes. The states that track the federal eavesdropping statutes fairly closely are:
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island,1 9 4 Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.1 95 Other states that are one-party
consent states and use a two-pronged definition of oral communication but do not track
the federal statutes include: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri,1 9 6 North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. 197
Other states protect a face-to-face conversation using a term other than "oral
communication" but define the term using subjective and objective components. The
Alaska eavesdropping statutes protect "private communication" and define the term using
the two-pronged Katz test.198 The eavesdropping statutes of Georgia'99 and Kansas2 0 0
protect "private conversation" made in a "private place" and define private place as a
location where one can be "reasonably safe" from "surveillance." The Maine
eavesdropping statutes protect the privacy of sounds made in a "private place" and define
private place as a location where one can be "reasonably safe" from "surveillance." 2 0 1 The
New York eavesdropping statutes protect "conversation" but the statutes do not define
conversation;202 New York case law indicates that a conversation made with a reasonable
203expectation of privacy is protected against recording.
Other states protect a face-to-face conversation against being secretly taped but
do not provide a definition for the type of conversation protected.204 These states are:
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Nevada. The Alabama
205eavesdropping statutes protect "private communication"; the eavesdropping statutes of
his side of the telephone conversation, he was yelling loud enough to be heard in the next apartment. 695 A.2d at
591, 595. The Kirsh court found that "absent a reasonable expectation of privacy, the recording of conversations,
per se, is not illegal" and the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in "conversations ... heard
through a hole in the floor, and tape recorded." 575 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
193 See, e.g., Dickersonv. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd in part, 601 N.W.2d 108
(Mich. 1999). The conversation took place in a public park with one of the parties wearing a microphone that
simultaneously broadcast the conversation to a TV van. On appeal the Michigan Supreme Court stated "the
question whether plaintiffs conversation was private depends on whether she intended and reasonably expected
it to be private at the time and under the circumstances involved." Dickerson v. Raphael, 601 N.W.2d 108, 108
(Mich. 1999).
194 In Rhode Island, the term "oral communication" is defined in a criminal procedure statute, rather than in the
eavesdropping statute. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-5.1-1(10) (West 2006).
195 See infra app A (Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
196 Missouri eavesdropping statutes protect "oral communication" where the conversation is intercepted using a
microphone transmitting the conversation elsewhere and define the term using the two-pronged Katz test. See
app A (Missouri).
197 See infra app. A (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming).
198 See infra app. A (Alaska).
199 See infra app. A (Georgia).
200 See infra app. A (Kansas).
201 See infra app. A (Maine).
202 See infra app. A (New York).
203 People v. Kirsh, 575 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307-08 (App. Div. 1991).
204 See infra app. A (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Nevada).
205 See infra app. A (Alabama).
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Arkansas,206 Kentucky,207 and Tennessee208 protect "oral communication"; the
Connecticut eavesdropping statutes20 9 protect "conversation"; and the Nevada
eavesdropping statutes210 protect "private conversation." In these states, lack of a
definition for the type of conversation being protected is problematic for a bystander
taping an encounter with a police officer. The police officer could claim that the taping
was illegal even if the taping were done in a location traditionally open to the public, such
as a street or a park.
As one might imagine, arresting someone who is videotaping an encounter with a
police officer has been challenged under the theory that the First Amendment protects the
videotaping. The following section discusses First Amendment protection for videotaping
a police officer.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION
There is a circuit split as to whether there is a First Amendment right o record a
police officer and the United States Supreme Court has yet to clarify whether such a First
Amendment right exists. However, two federal courts of appeals, the first and the seventh
circuits, found that the First Amendment protects civilian taping of encounters with police
officers.211 These cases are discussed in subsections A and B below.
As one might expect, a much higher percentage of cases advocating a First
Amendment right o gather information are from all-party consent states than from one-
party consent states because it is easier for a police officer in an all-party consent state to
allege that the civilian taping an encounter with a police officer has violated the state
eavesdropping statute. Although just over one-fifth of the states have all-party consent
eavesdropping statutes, just over sixty percent of the cases discussed in this section are
from all-party consent states.
A. The Seventh Circuit
The impetus behind the seventh circuit's 2012 decision in American Civil
Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez212 was the ACLU's planned "police accountability
program" pursuant to which individuals would videotape and audiotape public police
officer activity where the police officer's conversation could be heard by a bystander.
Fearful that the individuals taping would be charged under the Illinois eavesdropping
statutes, the ACLU filed the lawsuit against he Cook County State Attorney requesting
that the judge enter an injunction preventing enforcement of the eavesdropping statutes
against individuals participating in the planned program.2 13 The Illinois eavesdropping
statutes make recording a conversation illegal except with the consent of all parties to the
206 See infra app. A (Arkansas).
207 See infra app. A (Kentucky).
208 See infra app. A (Tennessee).
209 See infra app. A (Connecticut).
210 See infra app. A (Nevada).
211 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012), on remand,
No. 10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2012) (granting the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and a permanent injunction); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2014); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011).
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conversation and do not limit protection to those conversations made with an expectation
214
of privacy.
In considering "whether the First Amendment prevents Illinois prosecutors from
enforcing the eavesdropping statute against people who openly record police officers
performing their official duties in public,"2 15 the court emphasized the all-inclusive nature
of the Illinois statutes.216 The court found that "[t]he act of making an audio or audiovisual
recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and
press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording."21 7 The court
reasoned that the Illinois statute "restricts . . . an integral step in the speech process" as it
"interferes with the gathering and dissemination of information about government officials
performing their duties in public." 218 The court noted that recorders are devices generally
available and used by the public, with the characteristics of being "uniquely reliable and
powerful methods of preserving and disseminating news and information about events that
occur in public" and "self-authenticating" making "it highly unlikely that other methods
could be considered reasonably adequate substitutes."2 19
The court remanded the case to the federal district court to enjoin the "State's
Attorney from applying the Illinois eavesdropping statute against the ACLU and its
employees or agents who openly audio record the audible communications of law-
enforcement officers (or others whose communications are incidentally captured) when
the officers are engaged in their official duties in public places."220 After the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari,22 1 the federal district court granted the ACLU's motion
for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction barring the State's Attorney
from enforcing the Illinois statute against those participating in the ACLU accountability
222
program.
B. The First Circuit
Glik v. Cunniffe was a 2011 case from the first circuit in which Glik was walking
past the Boston Common when he began using his cell phone to videotape three officers
ten feet away, allegedly using excessive force, arresting a young male.223 Following the
214 Id. at 587. The Alvarez court described the history of the eavesdropping statutes, including an interesting
interplay between the judicial and legislative branches. Id. A 1986 Illinois Supreme Court case involved an
arrestee with a tape recorder seated in the back seat of a patrol car who taped a conversation between two officers
in the front seat. People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 347-48 (Ill. 1986). The Beardsley court read into the
eavesdropping statute a requirement that there be a reasonable expectation of privacy for the conversation to be
protected. "Because there was no surreptitious interception of a communication intended by the declarants to be
private, secret, or confidential, under circumstances justifying such expectation, there was no violation of the
eavesdropping statute." Id. at 350. Eight years later, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the same path in
deciding that "the Illinois eavesdropping statute ... allows the recording of a conversation by a party to that
conversation." People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Ill. 1994).
In response to Beardsley and Herrington, the Illinois legislature amended the Illinois statute to include
participant recording without the consent of all parties as eavesdropping and to expand protected conversations
beyond those made with an expectation of privacy. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 587.
215 Id. at 586.
216 Id. at 595. "Unlike the federal wiretapping statute and the eavesdropping laws of most other states, . . . the
[Illinois] statute sweeps much more broadly, banning all audio recording of any oral communication absent
consent of the parties regardless of whether the communication is or was intended to be private." Id.
217 id.
218 Id at 600.
219 Id at 596, 607.
220 Id at 608.
221 Alvarez v. ACLU of Ill., 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012).
222 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2012).
223 Glikv. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
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completion of the arrest, one of the officers asked Glik whether Glik was taping the audio
portion of the encounter. The officer arrested Glik under the Massachusetts eavesdropping
statute after Glik admitted that he was taping sound.22 4 After the eavesdropping charge
was dismissed, Glik filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the police officers and the City
of Boston.225
The court found that "the First Amendment protects the filming of government
officials in public spaces [and] accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district
,,226courts. The court stated that there was no reason to distinguish this case from a prior
case in which the court had noted that a journalist was exercising his First Amendment
right to film officials.227 "[C]hanges in technology and society have made the lines
between private citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw." 2 2 8 However, "the
right to film ... may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."229 Glik
did not run afoul of any of these limitations as he was in a public park at a safe distance
from the arrest and did not interfere with the arrest in any way.230 The court held that,
"though not unqualified, a citizen's right to film government officials, including law
enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and
well-established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment."231 The court concluded that
"the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to the appellants on Glik's
First Amendment claim."
23 2
Glik's Fourth Amendment claim was that the officer lacked probable cause to
arrest Glik because his taping was not done secretly and taping secretly was a prerequisite
233to violating the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute. After reviewing Massachusetts
cases interpreting the statute, the court determined that the cases "indicate that the use of a
recording device in 'plain sight,' as here, constitutes adequate objective evidence of actual
knowledge of the recording" and, on top of that, "here the police officers made clear
through their conduct that they knew Glik was recording them."234 The court concluded
that "Glik's recording was not 'secret' within the meaning of Massachusetts's wiretap
statute, and therefore the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him." 2 3 5 Therefore, the
236court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for the police officers.
Almost three years after Glik, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit had occasion to determine in Gericke v. Begin whether Glik applied to a bystander
224 Id. at 79-80.
225 Id. at 80.
226 Id. at 83.
227 Id. "[T]he news-gathering protections of the First Amendment cannot turn on professional credentials or
status." Id. at 84.
228 Id. The court explained:
The proliferation of electronic devices with video-recording capability means that many of
our images of current events come from bystanders with a ready cell phone or digital
camera rather than a traditional film crew, and news stories are now just as likely to be




231 Id. at 85.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 86.
234 Id. at 87.
235 Id. at 88.
236 Id. at 89.
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appearing to videotape a traffic stop "where there was no police order [for Gericke] to stop
,,237filming or leave the area.
Late in the evening of March 24, 2010 in Weare, New Hampshire, Carla Gericke,
part of a two-car caravan, was following Tyler Hanslin's car when a police car behind
them activated its emergency lights. Both Gericke and Hanslin pulled over and the police
car parked between them. When the police officer told Gericke that Hanslin's car was the
one being pulled over and asked Gericke to move her car, Gericke told the officer that she
would pull into an adjacent school parking lot at least thirty feet away. After moving her
car to the parking lot, Gericke exited her car, announced that she would videotape the
stop, and attempted to do so.238 Although Gericke's camera malfunctioned and failed to
record, Gericke continued to act as if she were taping the incident even after the officer
ordered her to return to her car.239 According to Gericke, the officer did not order her to
stop taping nor did the officer order her to move her car.2 40
After other officers arrived, Gericke was arrested for failing to produce her
license and registration. At the police station, Gericke was charged with disobeying a
police officer, obstructing a government official, and illegally taping a conversation under
New Hampshire law.24 1 After neither the town prosecutor nor the county attorney pressed
the charges, Gericke filed a civil rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the police
officers, the Weare police department, and the town of Weare for violating her First
242Amendment right by charging her with illegally taping a conversation. The officers
filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to find that they had qualified
immunity, as there was no clearly established right to videotape a traffic stop.243
At the trial level, the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire denied the motion for summary judgment, largely because the facts were
unclear as to whether Gericke was disruptive. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal of
their motion for summary judgment, accepting Gericke's version of the facts solely for
purposes of the appeal. The issue before the First Circuit was "whether it was clearly
established that Gericke was exercising a First Amendment right when she attempted to
film Sergeant Kelley during the traffic stop."24 4
According to the court, Glik and Gericke were similar in that someone was
245attempting to gather information on a police officer performing a duty in public.
Although an officer may place reasonable restrictions on taping a traffic stop, "a police
order that is specifically directed at the First Amendment right o film police performing
their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can reasonably
conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, with his duties."246
Because in Glik the court found that a First Amendment right to tape a police officer
performing a duty in public was clearly established and the Glik incident occurred more
than two years prior to the Gericke incident, Gericke's First Amendment right to
237 Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 3, 10 (1st Cir. 2014).
238 Id. at 3.
239 id.
240 id
241 Id. at 4.
242 id
243 id
244 Id. at 5.
245 Id. at 7.
246 id. at 8
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videotape was clearly established.24 7
Thus, the court found Glik controlling as to Gericke's First Amendment right o
videotape. "It was clearly established at the time of the stop that the First Amendment
right to film police carrying out their duties in public, including a traffic stop, remains
unfettered if no reasonable restriction is imposed or in place."2 48 The court held "that the
district court properly denied qualified immunity to the officers on Gericke's § 1983 claim
that the wiretapping charge constituted retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First
Amendment."249
Although the court affirmed the denial of the officers' motion for summary
judgment on Gericke's version of the facts, it left open the possibility that the fact-finder
could reach a different conclusion at trial. "Of course, a trial might leave a fact-finder with
a different view of whether Sergeant Kelley ordered Gericke to leave the area or stop
filming. That view, in tum, might affect the court's analysis of the availability of qualified
immunity to the officers."
250
C. The Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits
Three federal courts found that a First Amendment right to tape a government
official was not clearly established under the circumstances, entitling the official to
qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim.251 However, the courts did not state
that a First Amendment right to gather information does not exist.
In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, a third circuit case from Pennsylvania, Brian
Kelly was riding with his friend in his friend's truck when a police officer stopped the
252truck for alleged traffic violations2. Kelly was accustomed to carrying his video camera
with him, which he used to tape various encounters. During the traffic stop, Kelly held the
camera in his lap and proceeded to tape the incident. It is unclear whether the camera was
in plain view of the officer. Later in the traffic stop, the officer told Kelly and the driver
that the officer was taping the stop and, according to the officer, it was then that the officer
realized that Kelly was taping. After confiscating Kelly's camera, the officer telephoned
Assistant District Attorney Birbeck to inquire whether the officer could arrest Kelly for
violating the Pennsylvania eavesdropping statute because Kelly had failed to inform the
officer that Kelly was taping the traffic stop.253 The officer arrested Kelly based on
Birbeck telling the officer it was appropriate to do so, but the charge was later dropped.
Believing that the officer and the Borough of Carlisle had violated his First and Fourth
254Amendment rights, Kelly filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against hem.
The court first considered Kelly's Fourth Amendment claim in light of the
officer's conversation with Birbeck. The court held "that a police officer who relies in
good faith on a prosecutor's legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is
presumptively entitled to qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment claims premised on
247 Id. at 9.
248 Id. at 10.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 10 n.13.
251 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010); Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App'x 852, 852
(4th Cir. 2009); Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 11-1009 JB/KBM, 2013 WL 312881, at *57 (D. N.M.
Jan. 14, 2013) (deciding a case within 10th circuit jurisdiction).
252 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 252.
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a lack of probable cause."2 5 5 The court ordered that, on remand, the district court
investigate the facts to make findings as to whether the officer knew he was being
recorded at the beginning of the traffic stop and whether the officer asked Birbeck for
legal advice or for an arrest number.2 56 The appellate court found that the lower court had
erred in reviewing case law interpreting the Pennsylvania eavesdropping statute, as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had twice held that recording a police officer did not violate
the statute where the police officer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 257 and
"it was also clearly established that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when recording conversations with suspects."2 5 8
In considering Kelly's First Amendment claim, the court held "that the right to
videotape police officers during traffic stops was not clearly established and Officer
Rogers was entitled to qualified immunity on Kelly's First Amendment claim."259 The
court characterized traffic stops as "inherently dangerous situations" and pointed out that
courts within the third circuit that had recognized a First Amendment right o tape a police
260officer had not dealt with the traffic stop environment.
Szymecki v. Houck, a case from Virginia, was a brief, unpublished decision of the
261United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In the decision, the court agreed
with the lower court's conclusion "that Szymecki's asserted First Amendment right to
record police activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit at the
time of the alleged conduct."262
In Alocek v. City ofAlbuquerque, a case from New Mexico, Mocek had a practice
of refusing to show identification when passing through a Transportation Security
263Administration airport checkpoint. In 2009, Mocek was passing through the checkpoint
at the Albuquerque airport when he refused to show identification and began videotaping
the incident. One of the Transportation Security Administration officers (TSOs) ordered
Mocek to stop filming and called in officers from the Albuquerque Aviation Police
255 Id at 255-56. The court noted that "a plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing that, under all the
factual and legal circumstances surrounding the arrest, a reasonable officer would not have relied on the
prosecutor's advice." Id. at 256.
256 Id. at 256.
257 Id at 257. The two cases are Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523 (Pa. 1998) and Commonwealthv. Henlen,
564 A.2d 905, 906 (Pa. 1989).
258 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 258.
259 
Id. at 263.
260 Id. at 262. "Moreover, even insofar as it is clearly established, the right to record matters of public concern is
not absolute; it is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions .... " Id. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378
F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2005) was one of the cases discussed in Kelly. Robinson was worried about safety
concerns regarding Pennsylvania state troopers conducting truck inspections on Route 41. After obtaining
permission from an adjoining landowner, Robinson began videotaping the inspections while positioned twenty to
thirty feet from the highway. In 2000, officers arrested him for harassment and he was convicted but did not
appeal the conviction. A similar incident and arrest occurred late in 2002; Robinson was found guilty, but on
appeal the judge dismissed the charge. Believing that the three officers had violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights, Robinson filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them. Id at 538. The court concluded that
"there can be no doubt that the free speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the
defendants on October 23, 2002." Id. at 541. The court reasoned that "[v]ideotaping is a legitimate means of
gathering information for public dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence, as it did in this case." Id.
The court found each of the three officers liable to Robinson, awarding Robinson $35,000 in compensatory
damages against the three officers, jointly and severally, and $2,000 in punitive damages against each of the
three officers. Id. at 545-46.
261 Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App'x 852, 852-53 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id at 853.
263 Mocekv. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 11-1009 JB/KBM, 2013 WL 312881, at *1 (D. N.M. Jan. 14, 2013).
2015] 91
31
Bast: Tipping the Scale in Favor Civilian Taping of Encounters with Pol
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Department (AAPD) when Mocek did not stop.264 The AAPD officers escorted Mocek
away from the checkpoint and placed him in a holding cell. Mocek had four criminal
charges filed against him but a jury acquitted him. 265 Believing that the TSOs and the
AAPD officers had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights, Mocek filed a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them.266
The location of the filming incident, the checkpoint of an airport terminal,
weighed heavily in the court's decision to grant the TSOs qualified immunity.
"[R]ecording TSA employees at a screening checkpoint raises safety concerns, because, if
Mocek had ill intentions and was able to record information regarding the TSA's screening
procedures which would allow someone to evade the procedures, the safety of passengers
at commercial airports would be jeopardized."2 67 The court found that Mocek's right to
videotape under the circumstances was not clearly established. "Just as the Court finds
that the TSOs did not violate Mocek's right to gather news, which entails some First
Amendment protection, neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has found that
Mocek's right to gather news in this context is clearly established."268 The court noted that
the United States Supreme Court had approved reasonable limitations on the exercise of
Constitutional rights in airports. "[T]he Supreme Court has upheld reasonable limitations
on First Amendment conduct in airport terminals, and thus a reasonable TSA agent in the
TSOs' shoes would not likely understand that telling Mocek to stop recording and
subsequently summoning the police when he refused to comply violated his rights."26 9
D. The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits
In 2000, one federal court of appeals found that civilians had a First Amendment
right to tape police officers and, in 1995, another federal court of appeals recognized in
271
passing a First Amendment right to videotape police officers.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Smith v. City of Cumming,
a case out of Georgia, in 2000.272 Aside from the allegation that police officers had
prevented Mr. Smith from videotaping police activities and that police officers had
harassed the Smiths, the facts in the Smiths' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit are non-existent in
273the decision. The court held that, 'a]s to the First Amendment claim under § 1983, we
agree with the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time,
manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct."274 The court
reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public
interest."275 The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants because,
"[a]lthough the Smiths have a right to videotape police activities, they have not shown that
the Defendants' actions violated that right." 276
264 Id. at *3.
265 Id. at *4.
266 Id. at *5.
267 Id. at *57.
268 Id. at *56.
269 Id.
270 Smithy. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (lthCir. 2000).
271 Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995).
272 Smith, 212 F.3d at 1332.
273 Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Fordyce v. City of Seattle in
1995.277 Fordyce was videotaping a protest march, including police officers on duty, and
later tried to videotape some bystanders.278 Fordyce alleged that in the earlier incident an
officer smashed the camera into Fordyce's face.2 79 In the later incident, a different officer
arrested Fordyce under the Washington eavesdropping statute when the bystanders
indicated that they did not want to be videoed.280 Several months later, a court dismissed
the charges.28 1 Believing that the city and eight officers had violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights, Fordyce filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them. The court
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.282 Of its
own accord and without a request from Fordyce, the lower court granted him declaratory
relief, "declaring that [the Washington eavesdropping statute] 'does not prohibit the
videotaping or sound-recording of conversations held in a public street, within the hearing
of persons not participating in the conversation, by means of a readily apparent recording
device."'
283
On appeal, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the officer who
allegedly attempted to stop Fordyce from videotaping the march. "[A] genuine issue of
material fact does exist regarding whether Fordyce was assaulted and battered by a Seattle
police officer in an attempt to prevent or dissuade him from exercising his First
Amendment right o film matters of public interest."284 Thus, the court assumed in passing
that Fordyce did have a First Amendment right to videotape the march and the court
repeated the existence of that right in the conclusion paragraph. "[A] genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning whether he interfered with Fordyce's First Amendment
right to gather news."285
Other information necessary to understand the tension behind a civilian taping an
encounter with a police officer are two common characteristics of police culture. These
characteristics are explained in the following section.
IV. "TESTILYING" AND THE CODE OF SILENCE
The job of the police officer is not an easy one, to say the least, with the officer
forced to make difficult decisions in the face of looming violence. "Patrol officers and
detectives deal with the public without direct oversight by administrative superiors, and so
they must be trusted to behave in an ethical way on their own."286 Often there is an outcry
from television viewers that suspects be apprehended almost immediately following a
newsworthy and violent televised incident. "When a terrible crime has occurred, the
277 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).
278 Id. at 438.
279 Id. at 439.
280 Id. at 438.
281 id.
282 id
283 Id at 439 (quoting Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 840 F. Supp. 784, 794 (W.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995)). On appeal, the court vacated the declaratory
judgment because the lower court had not provided Washington State a chance to be heard on the issue of the
constitutionality of the eavesdropping statute. Id at 442.
284 Id. at 439.
285 Id. at 442.
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public may demand that the police solve it 'no matter what hey have to do,' and so there
is pressure to use unnecessary force."28 7
The police officer wields immense power and this immense power should justify
allowing law enforcement activity to be scrutinized. Generally, a uniformed police officer
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while conducting official business
because the officer is performing a service to the public.288 One Maryland judge opined,
"Those of us who are public officials and are entrusted with the power of the state are
ultimately accountable to the public. When we exercise that power in public fora, we
should not expect our actions to be shielded from public observation."289 In addition, it is
routine for an officer to videotape a traffic stop, with certain statutes specifically
sanctioning this activity,2 9 0 and an officer may tape other interactions with the public via a
291body-mounted video camera. It would be anomalous for one who is deliberately taping
a conversation to claim that the conversation is private.
Society's general trust of police activity combined with police bravado means
that, without a citizen recording, the officer's testimony would be believable even if the
officer is falsifying information. In fact, officer falsification is so commonplace that the
Mollen Commission, charged with investigating the New York City Police Department,
referred to officer falsification of evidence as "testilying."292 If falsification of evidence
were to occur, a huge gulf may exist between the sights and sounds captured on videotape
and a witness recounting what transpired.
A police studies professor explained, "Many police departments attempt to
impose ethical standards and effective policing through policy, proscription, and
punishment."293 However, many incidents of police and minority encounters remain
uninvestigated, perhaps because there is no visual recordation of what happened. "A major
shortcoming of this approach is that most police actions will never be reviewed and, as a
practical matter, are unreviewable."2 94
287 Id.
288 See, e.g., State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *19 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2010)
("[O]n a public highway in full view of the public[,] ... the Troopers had [no] reasonable expectation of privacy
in their conversation with the Defendant which society would be prepared to recognize as reasonable."); Lewis v.
v. State, Dep't of Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1084, 1086 (Wash. 2006) ("[C]onversations with police officers are
not private. . . . [T]raffic stop conversations are not private[.]"); Burton v. York County Sheriffs Dep't, 594
S.E.2d 888, 895 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he manner in which the employees of the Sheriffs Department
prosecute their duties to be a large and vital public interest that outweighs their desire to remain out of the public
eye."); Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) ("[P]laintiffs, as
police officers on duty, searching a vehicle on a public street, cannot expect the same level of privacy as a private
citizen in a private place."). See also supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
289 Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *35.
290 See supra notes 79, 85, 115, 129, 150, 187 and accompanying text.
291 Andrea Noble, Police Now Armed with Video: Recording Can Protect Officer, Citizen Through Visual Proof
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/25/police-now-armed-with-
video/?page=all.
292 THE CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT] (" [P]olice falsifications ... [are] probably the most common form of police corruption ...
so common in some precincts that it has spawned its own word: 'testilying."'), available at
http://www.parc.info/client files/Special%/`20Reports/4%/`20-%/`2OMollen%/`2OCommission%/`20-%/`20NYPD.pdf.
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Citizen taping can balance the deference, sometimes undue, given the police
officer by the court and jury and provide an accurate portrayal of the incident. There may
be a significant discrepancy between citizen recording and a police officer's recount of an
incident. The Christopher Commission, which was charged with investigating the Rodney
King incident, found the arrest report to be inconsistent with the videotape.29 5 Jurors are
likely to believe police officer testimony and are not likely to have experienced police
corruption first-hand. Taping allows weighing the power of the police against the
corrective power of the citizenry. Courts and oversight boards are inadequate to prevent
police-inflicted harm, either intended or unintended.
The Mollen Commission description of officer falsification of evidence,
testilying, is frightening because it weakens the foundations of the criminal justice system.
The Mollen Commission found:
Police perjury and falsification of official records is a serious problem
facing the Department and the criminal justice system - largely because it is
often a "tangled web" that officers weave to cover for other underlying acts of
corruption or wrongdoing. One form of corruption thus breeds another that taints
arrests on the streets and undermines the credibility of police in the courtroom.296
The Mollen Commission found that falsification was widespread, "widely
tolerated by corrupt and honest officers alike, as well as their supervisors."2 9 7 The
justification for the falsification is that it is "'doing God's work' - doing whatever it takes
to get a suspected criminal off the streets."2 98
One of the root causes of police corruption is what is sometimes referred to as the
code of silence. This is "the silence of honest officers who fear the consequences of
'ratting' on another cop no matter how grave the crime."299 The Christopher Commission
found that "the greatest single barrier to the effective investigation and adjudication of
complaints is the officers' unwritten 'code of silence:' . . . an officer does not provide
adverse information against a fellow officer." 3 0 0 The Mollen Commission found the New
York City Police Department code of silence had not weakened since the Knapp
Commission, the prior police investigative commission of more than twenty years earlier.
"[T]he dishonest officers in the New York City Police Department still do not fear their
honest colleagues. . . . The vast majority of honest officers still protect the minority of
corrupt officers through a code of silence few dare to break."3 01 The honest officer may be
secretly relieved when a civilian taping exposes lying by a corrupt officer. "[A]1though
patrol officers openly expressed disgust over corruption and hoped corrupt officers would
295 INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://www.parc.info/client files/Special%/`20Reports/1%"o20-%/`2OChistopher%/2OCommision.pdf. The arrest
"report of the incident is inconsistent with the scenes captured on the Holliday videotape in terms of the number
and location of baton blows, as well as the description of King's 'resistance."' Id.
296 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 292, at 36. Falsification "typically occurs as a means to conceal
other underlying acts of corruption or to conceal illegal steps taken for what officers often perceive as
'legitimate' law enforcement ends." Id. at 37.
297 Id. at 40.
298 Id. at 41.299 
id. at 1.
300 CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 295, at 168.
301 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 292, at 51. "[I]t often appears to be strongest where corruption is
most frequent." Id. at 53. The Mollen Commission explained: "this is because the loyalty ethic is particularly
powerful in crime-ridden precincts where officers most depend upon each other for their safety each day - and
where fear and alienation from the community are the most rampant." Id.
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be fired, they nonetheless are highly reluctant to report corruption . . . .302 The code of
silence is part of the culture of a police department and is enforced by retaliation against
an officer who does provide negative information about a fellow officer. An officer who
fails to abide by the code is subject to being "ostracized and harassed" and may "become
the target of [police] complaints."3 0 3
The police culture is very much a product of the manner in which most police
departments are managed. "Changing police attitudes can be especially challenging given
that police departments are run on a military model that demands obedience to authority,
the surrender of officers' individuality, and the willingness to wield coercive power
against others."304
One must consider the pernicious intersection of testilying and the code of
silence as the backdrop against which increased civilian taping of encounters with police
officers occurs. For the officer, "[1]earning about the cultures of the communities police
serve is not enough. Police departments also have cultures that need to be examined-and
sometimes changed."3 0 5 Without the civilian tape, an officer might be tempted to falsify
information concerning the encounter to make sure that what the officer perceives to be
the right result is reached. Thus, a police officer charged with upholding the law would
feel free to act outside the constraints of the law. The code of silence would make sure that
the falsification remains undisclosed by fellow officers. However, audio recording is a
powerful counterbalance to testilying and the code of silence. But for the prevalence of
civilian recording, the police culture would dictate that the ends justify the means.
The following section analyzes civilian taping of encounters with police officers
in light of eavesdropping statutes, First Amendment protection for taping, and police
culture.
V. ANALYSIS
A more recent version of the Rodney King incident is that involving Oscar Grant
at the Fruitvale Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) station in Oakland, California.306 Early
on January 1, 2009, transit police officers were reacting to reports of a fight aboard a train
arriving at the Fruitvale station when they pulled a number of passengers, including Grant,
from the train. As the incident unfolded, a number of passengers videotaped the encounter
and captured an officer, Johannes Mehserle, fatally shooting Grant in the back.3 07 At least
one of those videos was posted online and Mehserle served less than a year after being
convicted of involuntary manslaughter.308 The online video spurred an aspiring filmmaker,
302 Id. at 56. "It is not surprising that the honest cop wants corrupt cops off the job. The consequences of
corruption for honest cops are grave: it taints their reputation, destroys their morale, and, most important,
jeopardizes their very safety." Id. at 57.
303 CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 295, at 170. "When an officer finally gets fed up and comes
forward to speak the truth, that will mark the end of his or her police career." Id.
304 O'Donnell, supra note 293, at 10.
305 Joseph D. McNamara, Policing Diverse Communities, EJOURNAL USA, Apr. 2011, at 5, available at
http://photos.state.gov/ibraries/korea/397355/April_201 1/Ethical-Policing-0413 11.pdf.
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Ryan Coogler, to make the movie, Fruitvale Station, which was released to the public in
July 2013 after winning awards at the Cannes and Sundance film festivals.309
Surprisingly enough, the new BART police chief, Kenton Rainey, gave his full
cooperation to Coogler's filming, allowing the murder scene to be filmed on the Fruitvale
station platform where Grant was shot. Rainey commented, "When Ryan came to us, we
really wanted to help in the making of this film, to help with the healing process" and
added, "The story's going to be told." 310 After the movie was complete, Rainey viewed it
with individuals from his command staff as a preventative measure. "It's important for us
to understand what we're doing, so that another incident like this never happens again."3 11
The movie has resonated with black males near the age of Grant, shot at twenty-
two years old.312 At twenty-four, Hamza Farrah identifies with Grant: "it's frightening to
think that the people who are sworn to protect and serve can also cause such great harm.
Growing up he said he was taught by his elders to just listen and obey police officers and
to not act 'black' around them."3 13 Farrah sees Fruitvale Station as "very important to
,,314show. He reasons, "It gives you a conscience of what's happening across the nation;
from Trayvon Martin to the Oscar Grant story. It shows you that race still matters and that
people are treated differently because of the color of their skin." 3 15
The typical police officer's focus is to protect society, sometimes by arresting
those accused of criminal activity. The police officer's interests while participating in the
encounter are to gather evidence, promote the safety of all persons involved, conduct an
efficient investigation, and gather evidence. The typical reader of this paper is from a
fairly affluent community, relying on the police force to enforce the law against
undesirable elements; however, someone not from an affluent community may hold a
radically different view of police activity. Insight may be gained by viewing police
activity from the extremes of a prosperous community, in which the police officer is
trusted, and a high-crime community, where police are not trusted. Typical jurors may
view a convicted criminal, or a person lacking formal education, or one from a low socio-
economic background as less credible than a police officer and are used to the official
framing of a civilian encounter with a police officer as recounted by the officer.
Citizen oversight is generally helpful, rarely harmful, and community policing
has been implemented within the last few decades. The benefits of recording interactions
with police officers are to encourage police accountability, promote use of justifiable
police tactics, serve as the basis of deserved discipline against an officer engaging in
misconduct, reduce harm to the individual, promote the free flow of discussion concerning
police activities, educate the public, and prevent and deter police misconduct. Some 400
316
persons annually die as the result of police officer shootings, yet many in non-minority
309 Id. The movie received the Prize of the Future award during the Cannes Film Festival and the Grand Jury
Prize and the Audience Award at the Sundance Film Festival. Ja'Nel Johnson, Fruitvale Station Shines Light on
Race, Police Accountability, KVNONEWS.COM (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.kvnonews.com/2013/08/fruitvale-
station/. The Oscar Grant incident took place in California, an all-party consent state; however, the passengers
who videotaped the incident did not run afoul of the California eavesdropping statutes because they were on a
BART platform open to the public where an expectation of privacy, especially considering the many train
passengers, would not have been objectively reasonable. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
310 "Fruitvale Station": Recreating a Tragic Loss of a Life, supra note 306.
311 id.







Bast: Tipping the Scale in Favor Civilian Taping of Encounters with Pol
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
communities remain unaware of incidents involving minorities and police officers, such as
the Oscar Grant incident, without a videotape of such an incident. "[T]he cell phone
footage of Oscar Grant's killing, much like the video footage captured of Rodney King's
,,317beating in 1991, has transformed police accountability. A criminal justice professor
noted, "The important thing is that there are tens of millions of people, white Americans,
who just don't believe these things happen. To see it happen made it real for them. It
transformed the public reaction to it." 3 18
Most citizens have video capability on their phones, which they carry with them,
and many phones allow recorded videos to be posted online. It would be natural for a
citizen to record an event in progress, such as one that involves a confrontation between
another citizen and someone in authority, followed by the common practice of posting the
video online. The video reinforces one's memory of the event and provides evidence of
events as they transpired. The video can furnish proof of the even where two individuals'
versions of the event differ. The video can exculpate a defendant. A video can provide
graphic images and audio of police brutality, misconduct, and corruption.
The cell phone is not a new technology but its use as a recording device with
access to the internet is fairly new. Technology, including the recording capabilities of cell
phones, has blurred the distinction between an official member of the press and a public-
minded citizen. Citizen-taping can capture newsworthy events when no professional
journalist is present and the press often requests use of citizen-taped material to
supplement news stories. Incidents videotaped by citizens, such as the Rodney King and
Oscar Grant incidents, may be picked up by the press and covered in great detail. Without
the videotapes of the Rodney King and Oscar Grant incidents, most would not have
believed the violence of the confrontations and the incidents would not have made
319news.
Taping is unique in that it memorializes the tension of the moment, capturing
what was said, with the tone of voice and context intact. The self-authenticating character
of taped information can corroborate one person's version of events or perhaps shed light
on an aspect of the incident not recalled by any participant or bystander. Without taping, it
would be the civilian's word against the officer's, neither of which might be entirely
accurate. Inaccuracy in recounting the event as it transpired may be due to the bias of the
viewer, faulty memory, or deliberate falsification. In fact, in some instances a recording
may show that there was no misconduct on the part of the police officer, who was
innocently performing a law enforcement duty, and the officer can use the recording to
show that there was no misconduct.32 0 An attorney who hears a recording of the encounter
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 295, at 12.
320 A videotape was the key in a United States Supreme Court case. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). In
Scott, Scott was the police officer pursuing Harris in a vehicle chase. The chase ended when Scott rear-ended
Harris' vehicle to stop it. Harris was seriously injured and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of his
constitutional rights. Id. at 375. The federal district court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment and the
federal court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 376. The Court reversed based on a videotape of the chase that
corroborated Scott's version of the facts. Id. at 376, 378. Harris' version of the facts was quite different in that
"rather than fleeing from police, [Harris] was attempting to pass his driving test." Id. at 378-79. In stark contrast,
the videotape showed:
[Harris'] vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that
are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the
double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders
to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of
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between the police officer and the potential client may be dissuaded from filing what the
attorney gauges to be a frivolous lawsuit. A recording may serve other police officers by
being the subject of officer training.
What would police activity be like without accountability overseen by citizens?
One expert on police accountability opined, "It's people of color who are the victims, for
the most part, of police misconduct."3 2 1 The expert continued, "Race is at the center of
policing. My view is that if we can fix police problems we can go a long way toward
fixing our race problem in this country."32 2 Mistrust between a minority citizen and a
police officer stifles effective policing. "Mistrust is created between citizens and the police
when officers are not held accountable for wrongdoings."3 23 The effect of this mistrust is
significant. "[P]olice depend on the public for their cooperation in dealing with crime and
disorder, but when people don't trust the police they don't report crime and that hampers
effective crime fighting." 324
For example, the Christopher Commission report recommended that an
independent group monitor the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, resulting in the Special
Counsel's office. 32 5 The office "consists of a team of experts that has full authority to audit
and monitor any aspect of the sheriff's department operations."326 The Special Counsel
follows the "auditor model" of citizen oversight, with a permanent, full-time staff, rather
than the other model, with "a part-time, volunteer citizen review board focusing on
specific complaints."327 The Special Counsel's office has had a positive effect on the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Department: "The Special Counsel's regular monitoring and reporting
on civil suits against the sheriff's office has reduced the number of lawsuits against he
department and amounts of monetary settlements paid to complainants."328
Taping would allow a check on the discretionary and often arbitrary power of a
police officer, an example of which is the almost unbridled power of a police officer to
pull over a vehicle for any traffic violation under Whren v. United States.329 Whren allows
a police officer to stop based on immutable and otherwise protected categories uch as
race.330 Taping can limit the objectionable activities of an officer who used the alleged
traffic violation as a pretext and made the stop for an improper motive.
time in the occasional center left-tum-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to
engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up. Far from being the cautious and
controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles
a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and
innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.
Id at 379-80 (footnote omitted).




325 Samuel Walker & Andrea Lorenz, Policing the Police: Citizens Encourage Ethical Policing, EJOURNAL USA,
Apr. 2011, at 23, available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/3973 55/April 201 1/Ethical-Policing-
0413 11.pdf
326 Id "The Special Counsel, which continues today, has issued 29 semi-annual public reports that address the
most critical issues related to police accountability: use of force, lawsuits against the department, personnel
issues, the management of district stations and innumerable other issues." Id.
327 id
328 id
329 Whrenv. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (holding that "probable cause to believe that petitioners had
violated the traffic code ... rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment").
330 Id. at 813. "[T]he constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] depend[] on the actual motivations
of the individual officers involved." Id. The Court added "that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of
the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
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The advances in technology have brought with them ready availability of
videotaping to civilians who have used this technology, among other uses, to record police
officer activity. This videotaping is often followed by the video being posted online. News
programs clamor for viewers to upload videos they have taken. This has spurred a tension
between technological capability to make a record and a police officer's perception that
the taping wrongfully interferes with law enforcement or challenges the officer's
authority. Technology has far outpaced the law, in effect tempting a civilian to tape
activity occurring in a location open to the public, with the civilian least suspecting that
taping could be illegal, and subjecting the civilian to imprisonment and fine. The civilian
may further increase the chance of having criminal charges filed for the allegedly illegal
taping by posting the video online and thus providing the prosecutor with evidence. With
further advances in technology and without amendment o the eavesdropping statutes, the
potential liability for a civilian taping a police officer engaged in official duties will only
increase.
Citizens who audio record or videotape conversations run the risk of being
arrested for violating eavesdropping statutes, even more so in the eleven states that require
all party consent prior to taping. The risk is greater where the person being recorded is a
police officer. This is so although several courts have found that the First Amendment
protects gathering such information. The civilian fear of arrest for taping an encounter
involving a police officer has a chilling effect on the civilian's gathering of information
concerning law enforcement. The eavesdropping statutes in most jurisdictions carry a
hefty prison term, or fine or both for their violation.
The person taping may be a participant in the conversation or a bystander. If the
person is a participant, the legality of the taping typically turns on whether the taping is
performed in a one-party or all-party consent jurisdiction. The action of taping provides
the requisite consent in a one-party consent jurisdiction but not in an all-party consent
jurisdiction. In an all-party consent jurisdiction, the participant taping may be able to
escape liability if the eavesdropping statute only protects private or confidential
conversations or those made with a reasonable expectation of privacy, especially where
the conversation takes place in a location open to the public. If the person taping is a
bystander, the requisite consent, from one party to the conversation in a one-party consent
jurisdiction or all-party consent in an all-party consent jurisdiction, may be lacking. If the
requisite consent is lacking, the bystander taping may be able to escape liability if the
eavesdropping statute only protects private or confidential conversations or those made
with a reasonable expectation of privacy, especially where the conversation takes place in
a location open to the public.
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Oregon eavesdropping statutes afford the most
expansive protection against a conversation being taped as they do not require a
reasonable expectation of privacy as a threshold for the conversation being protected and
require all-party consent. The Illinois statute necessarily views citizen recording at odds
with effective policing and carries an enhanced prison term of more than double the prison
term in other states for taping a police officer. Many other jurisdictions limit protection to
those having a reasonable expectation of privacy.
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.
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A citizen may be limited in taping a conversation with a police officer in all-party
consent states; however, the police officer does not usually have to abide by the same
constraints. In addition, the police have ready access to being able to record their
encounters with citizens and several states have an explicit statutory exemption from
eavesdropping liability for a police officer taping such an encounter. The limitation of
citizen taping obscures transparency in law enforcement and civilian oversight. This
disparity in the legal right to tape an encounter between a citizen and a police officer
creates a double standard, with the balance tipped in favor of the police officer.
Police officers may not be educated as to whether a citizen is permitted to tape a
conversation involving a police officer and sometimes limits on police conduct are
unclear. By the same token, a civilian may not understand whether the state eavesdropping
statute applies to an encounter with a police officer, allowing the police officer to
intimidate the civilian into stopping taping. Eavesdropping statutes differ from state to
state and differ from the federal eavesdropping statutes, possibly leading to more
confusion. Also, as discussed earlier in this paper, eavesdropping statutes of several states
lack clarity and some have rarely been subject to court interpretation.
Given this inherent tension, it might be well to consider the players involved, the
civilian, the police officer, and society, as viewed against a backdrop of fairness and
justice. One could view the civilian as law-abiding, generally cooperative with police
involvement, and willing to assist in apprehending someone who is breaking the law. The
civilian's interests in taping an encounter with a police officer are to gather evidence, deter
police misconduct, and participate in community policing efforts. This civilian views the
lawbreaker as someone other than the civilian himself and might be shocked by the reach
of criminal statutes on the books, especially where a criminal statute, such as an
eavesdropping statute, is enforced against the civilian. Society has an interest in seeing
criminal statutes enforced by police officers and is understandably dismayed when police
misconduct is uncovered.331 The associate producer of the movie Fruitvale Station
explained that "people living in homogeneous environments may not interact with people
of different backgrounds, which can instigate fear when all they see are negative stories in
the news about people unlike them."3 3 2
VI. AN EXEMPTION AUTHORIZING TAPING AN ENCOUNTER WITH A POLICE
OFFICER
As discussed above, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and
Seventh Circuits recently found that the First Amendment protects civilian taping of
encounters with police officers.3 33 This may signal a trend of recognizing that the First
Amendment protects civilian taping of their encounters with police officers. However, this
movement in constitutional law may amount to little real protection for a civilian, such as
Mannie Garcia, faced with a discretionary criminal charge of general applicability.
331 See generally MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 292; and CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 295.
332 Johnson, supra note 309. "[The movie Fruitvale Station] gives [Grant] back his sense of humanity. That's the
whole point- to see it as a real three dimensional person instead of a statistic." Id.
333 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012),
cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012), on remand, No. 10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (granting the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction).
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There should be an exemption in the eavesdropping statutes that guarantees the
right of a civilian to audiotape a police officer. The following is suggested statutory
language :334
It is lawful for a person not acting under color of law to record the
conversation of a law enforcement officer who is performing a public duty in a
public place and any other person who is having a conversation with that law
enforcement officer if the conversation is at a volume audible to the unassisted
ear of the person who is making the recording. For purposes of this subsection,
"public place" means any place to which the public has access and includes, but
is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, and highways (including inside motor
vehicles), and the common areas of public and private facilities and buildings.
Any person whose right to record under this section has been violated
shall have a civil cause of action against the law enforcement officer who
stopped, prevented, or resulted in the destruction of such recording and shall have
the right to collect no less than $1,000 nor more than $2,500, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred,
personally from the law enforcement officer. In addition, the police officer shall
be suspended from official duties for not less than seven nor more than twenty-
one days without pay. An affirmative defense is that the law enforcement officer
exhibited an expectation of privacy in the conversation that was reasonable under
the circumstances or that the officer's actions prevented immediate and serious
injury to the officer or bystanders.
Such an exemption clearly places a police officer on notice that a civilian does
have the right to tape an encounter with a police officer. The exemption allows a civilian,
whether a bystander or a party to the conversation, to tape the conversation of a uniformed
police officer performing official duties in a location open to the public. In addition, the
proposed legislation gives the civilian a private right of action against a police officer who
fails to abide by the exemption. This penalty reinforces the civilian's right to tape and
should be sufficiently onerous to dissuade a police officer from interfering with civilian
taping. The right of action makes the police officer personally liable to pay the civilian a
stipulated damages award and results in the officer's suspension from official duties
without pay for a reasonable amount of time. Police officer liability automatically attaches
should the police officer's actions result in destruction of the audiotape. Police officer
liability under the private right of action is a presumption that can be rebutted by the
police officer upon a showing that the officer did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, perhaps when discussing confidential information or dealing with a confidential
informant or an undercover police officer, or the officer's actions prevented substantial
injury to the police officer or bystanders.
CONCLUSION
Given the reality of police culture and the civilian's easy access to recording,
civilian recording is needed now more than ever. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions have been
ineffective in checking police intimidation of civilian taping of encounters with police
officers. Perhaps this is because the videos of such encounters have not been as dramatic
as the Rodney King or the Oscar Grant incidents. Except for the individuals personally
334 The proposed statutory language borrows from the text of Illinois Senate Bill 1575 (SB 1575) introduced in
2013. S.B. 1575, 98 h Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
102 [Vol. 5
42
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/4
2015] TIPPING THE SCALES IN FAVOR OF CIVILIAN TAPING 103
intimidated by police while taping, this police harassment has not struck a chord with the
public. The difficulty of being successful in a § 1983 action may mean that protection for
gathering newsworthy information should come from legislation designed specifically to
protect newsgathering.
The prior section of this paper included a proposed exemption from civilian
liability under the eavesdropping statutes; in addition, the proposed legislation would
provide the civilian who is wrongly arrested a private right of action against he arresting
police officer.
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APPENDIX A
United States
One who "intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . oral . . . communication" is subject
to five years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(1), (4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2014).
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a[n] ... oral . . . communication where such
person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State.
Id. § 2511(2)(d). Oral communication is defined as "any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." Id. § 2510(2).
Alabama
The state defines eavesdrop as "[tlo overhear, record, amplify or transmit any
part of the private communication of others without the consent of at least one of the
persons engaged in the communication, except as otherwise provided by law." ALA. CODE
§ 13A-1 1-30(1) (2006). Eavesdropping is a class A misdemeanor. Id. § 13A-1 1-31. It may
be punished by not more than a year imprisonment or a fine of not more than $6,000, or
both. Id. §§ 13A-5-2(c), 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1). A defense is that "[h]e was a
peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." Id. § 13A-1 1-36. Research
failed to locate case law interpreting "private communication."
Alaska
The state eavesdropping statute states that "[a] person may not . . . use an
eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any part of an oral conversation without the
consent of a party to the conversation." ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.310(a) (West,
Westlaw through legislation effective April 24, 2014, passed during the 2014 2nd Reg.
Sess. of the 28th Legislature). There are several definitions that help understand what is
prohibited. "'[O]ral communication' means human speech used to communicate
information from one party to another." "' [I]ntercept' means the aural or other acquisition
of the contents of an oral . . . communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device, including the acquisition of the contents by simultaneous
transmission or by recording." "' [C]ontents' includes information obtained from a private
communication concerning the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of the
communication, or the identity of a party of the communication." "' [P]rivate
communication' means an oral . . . communication uttered or transmitted by a person who
has a reasonable expectation that the communication is not subject to interception." Id. §
42.20.390(2), (7), (9), (11). Eavesdropping is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to
one year imprisonment, or up to a $10,000 fine, orboth. Id. §§ 12.55.015(a), 12.55.035(b),
12.55.135(a), 42.20.330.
Article 1, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution provides: "The right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22.
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In State v. Glass, 583 P2d 872, 879 (Alaska 1978), the Alaska Supreme Court held "that
Alaska's privacy amendment prohibits the secret electronic monitoring of conversations
upon the mere consent of a participant" where the informant was sent into the suspect's
home wearing a body bug, which allowed officers located outside to record the
conversation. Id. at 874. However, in later opinions, the Alaska Supreme Court found that
a drunk driving suspect's expectation of privacy was not reasonable and, thus, the
suspect's conversation was not protected under the Alaska Constitution from being
secretly taped. City and Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1984)
(finding that drunk driving suspect's expectation of privacy was not reasonable where
uniformed officer was performing official duties and, therefore, taped information was not
inadmissible); Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1979) (finding that drunk
driving suspect's expectation of privacy was not reasonable where the suspect was under
arrest and in police headquarters undergoing breathalyzer and sobriety tests when he was
secretly taped and, therefore, his right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution was not
violated).
Arizona
The state statute provides: "a person is guilty of a class 5 felony who . . .
[i]ntentionally intercepts a conversation or discussion at which he is not present, or aids,
authorizes, employs, procures or permits another to so do, without the consent of a party
to such conversation or discussion." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2010). "'Oral
communication' means a spoken communication that is uttered by a person who exhibits
an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying the expectation." Id. § 13-3001.8. The statutes exempt "[t]he interception of any
... oral communication by any person, if the interception is effected with the consent of a
party to the communication or a person who is present during the communication." Id §
13-3012.9. The penalty for a class 5 felony is from six months to two and one half years
imprisonment, "an amount fixed by the court not more than one hundred fifty thousand
dollars," orboth. Id §§ 13-702.D., 13-801.
Arkansas
The state statute provides: "It is unlawful for a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral. .
communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the
person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to the interception and recording." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120(a)
(West, Westlaw through end of 2014 Second Extraordinary Session). The same statute
classifies a violation as a Class A misdemeanor. Id § 5-60-120(b). One guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor may be fined a maximum of $2,500, or sentenced to a maximum of one year
imprisonment, or both. Id §§ 5-4-201(b), 5-4-104(d), 5-4-401(b). Research failed to locate
case law interpreting "oral communication."
Colorado
The state statute provides: "Any person not visibly present during a conversation
or discussion commits eavesdropping if he . . . [k]nowingly overhears or records such
conversation or discussion without the consent of at least one of the principal parties
thereto." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-304(1) (West, Westlaw current through the
Second Regular Session of the Sixty-Ninth General Assembly (2014)). See People v.
Lesslie, 24 P.3d 22, 28 (Colo. App. 2000) ("recognize[ing] that this criminal statute
requires a case-by-case analysis as to whether the participants in the intercepted
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conversations have a justifiable expectation of privacy and, in turn, whether they believe
that their conversation is subject to interception"). The same statute classifies
eavesdropping as a Class 1 misdemeanor. Id. § 18-9-304(2). "'Oral communication'
means any oral communication uttered by any person believing that such communication
is not subject o interception, under circumstances justifying such belief ..... Id. § 18-9-
301(8). See People v. Lesslie, 939 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo. App. 1996) (finding
"conversation" or "discussion" synonymous with "oral communication"). One guilty of a
Class 1 misdemeanor may be sentenced to a minimum of six months and a maximum of
eighteen months, or a minimum fine of $500 and a maximum fine of $5,000, or both. §
18-1.3-501(l)(a).
Connecticut
In Connecticut, eavesdropping, the "mechanical overhearing of a conversation,"
is a class D felony. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West, Westlaw through
enactments of Public Acts of the 2014 February Regular Session of the Connecticut
General Assembly effective on or before July 1, 2014). The Connecticut statutes define
"[m]echanical overhearing of a conversation" as "the intentional overhearing or recording
of a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a
person not present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment." Id § 53a-
187(a)(2). The prison term for a class D felony is not more than five years (effective
October 1, 2013) and the fine is not more than $5,000; the court may impose
imprisonment, or a fine, or both. Id. §§ 53a-28, 53a-35a(8), 53a-41(4). Research failed to
locate case law interpreting "conversation."
Delaware
The state statute provides that "no person shall ... [i]ntentionally intercept ...
any . . . oral . . . communication" and specifies that someone who eavesdrops has
committed a class E felony and is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014, ch. 388). Pursuant to
that statute:
It is lawful . . . [flor a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral . . .
communication where the person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
the interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
constitutions or laws of the United States, this State or any other state or
any political subdivision of the United States or this or any other state.
Id § 2402(c)(4). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered
by a person made while exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject
to interception and under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id § 2401(13).
Georgia
The state statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for . . . [a]ny person in a
clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or record or attempt to overhear,
transmit, or record the private conversation of another which shall originate in any private
place." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (West, Westlaw through Acts 343 to 346, 348 to 631,
and 633 to 669 of the 2014 Regular Session). "'Private place' means a place where one is
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entitled reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance."
Id. § 16-11-60(3). The eavesdropping statute "does not prohibit one party to a
conversation from secretly recording or transmitting it without the knowledge or consent
of the other party." State v. Birge, 241 S.E.2d 213, 213 (Ga. 1978). "[A]ny person
violating any of the provisions of this part shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years
or a fine not to exceed $10,000.00, or both." § 16-11-69.
Hawaii
The state statute provides that "any person who . . . [i]ntentionally intercepts ...
any . . . oral . . . communication . .. shall be guilty of a class C felony." HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 803-42(a) (West, Westlaw through Act 235 [End] of the 2014 Regular Session of the
Hawaii Legislature). Pursuant to that statute:
It shall not be unlawful under this part for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral . . . communication when the
person is a party to the communication or when one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to the interception unless the
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of this State.
Id. § 803-42(b)(3)(A). "'Oral communication' means any utterance by a person
exhibiting an expectation that the utterance is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying that expectation ..... Id § 803-41. The prison term for a class C
felony is not less than one year and not more than five years and the fine is not more than
$10,000; the court may impose imprisonment, or a fine, or both. Id §§ 706-605, 706-640,
706-660.
Idaho
The state statute provides:
any person shall be guilty of a felony and is punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison for a term not to exceed five (5) years or by a fine not
to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both fine and
imprisonment if that person . . . [w]illfully intercepts . . . any . . . oral
communication.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Second
Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). Pursuant to that statute, "[i]t is lawful
under this chapter for a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral communication when one (1) of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." Id § 18-
6702(2)(d). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 18-6701(2).
Indiana
The state statute provides:
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(a) This section does not apply to a person who makes an
interception authorized under federal law.
(b) A person who knowingly or intentionally intercepts, a
communication in violation of this article commits unlawful
interception, a Level 5 felony.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33.5-5-5 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014). See State v.
Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653, 660 (Ind. 2000) ("[O]ur legislature did not intend to directly
incorporate the Federal Wiretap Act statutory or case law into Indiana's Act but instead
meant to exempt from its provisions federal law enforcement surveillance activities within
Indiana's borders."). Research failed to locate case law interpreting "communication."
Arguably, communication refers only to communication via the telephone or telegraph
and not to face-to-face conversation. The title of article 33.5 is "Interception of Telephonic
or Telegraphic Communications" and an Indiana statute, § 35-33.5-1-5 repealed effective
July 1, 2012, contained the following definition:
"Interception" means the intentional:
(1) recording of; or
(2) acquisition of the contents of;
a telephonic or telegraphic communication by a person other than a
sender or receiver of that communication, without the consent of the
sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device, or
equipment under this article.
Id. § § 35-33.5-1-5 (repealed 2012).
Iowa
The state statute provides:
Any person, having no right or authority to do so, . . . who by any
electronic or mechanical means listens to, records, or otherwise intercepts a
conversation or communication of any kind, commits a serious misdemeanor;
provided, . . . one who is openly present and participating in or listening to a
communication shall not be prohibited hereby from recording such message or
communication ....
IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 2014). Another state statute provides: "a person
who does any of the following commits a class 'D' felony: . . . [w]illfully intercepts ...
a[n] ... oral ... communication." Id. § 808B.2.1. Pursuant o the statute:
It is not unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color
of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral . . . communication if the person is a
party to the communication or if one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to the interception, unless the communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state
or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
Id § 808B.2.2.c. "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to
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interception, under circumstances justifying that expectation." Id. § 808B.1.8. "A class 'D'
felon, not an habitual offender, shall be confined for no more than five years, and in
addition shall be sentenced to a fine of at least seven hundred fifty dollars but not more
than seven thousand five hundred dollars." Id. § 902.9.1.
Kansas
The state statute provides:
Breach of privacy is knowingly and without lawful authority:
(3) entering with intent to listen surreptitiously to private
conversations in a private place or to observe the personal conduct
of any other person or persons entitled to privacy therein; [or]
(4) installing or using outside or inside a private place any device
for hearing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds
originating in such place, which sounds would not ordinarily be
audible or comprehensible without the use of such device, without
the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101(a) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1,
2014, including Chapters 1 through 152 (End) of the 2014 Regular Session of the Kansas
Legislature). That statute provides that breach of privacy is a class A nonperson
misdemeanor. Id. § 21-6101(b). In addition, it defines "private place" as "a place where
one may reasonably expect to be safe from uninvited intrusion or surveillance." Id. § 21-
6101. The statute has been interpreted to allow taping upon consent of one party to the
conversation. In a 1984 case, the Kansas Supreme Court found that "any party to a private
conversation may waive the right of privacy and the non-consenting party has no Fourth
Amendment or statutory right to challenge that waiver." State v. Roudybush, 686 P.2d
100, 108 (Kan. 1984). Further, the court held "that a face-to-face 'private conversation'
between a police informer and a suspect is not an 'oral communication' as defined by
K.S.A. 22-2514 and, thus, it is not necessary to obtain an ex parte court order to intercept
such conversation if the informer knowingly consents to the interception." Id. A class A
nonperson misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or a
fine of $2,500, orboth. §§ 21-6602(a),(b), 21-6611(b).
For the purpose of obtaining a court order to intercept a conversation, "'oral
communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation." § 22-2514(2).
Kentucky
Pursuant to the state statute, "[a] person is guilty of eavesdropping when he
intentionally uses any device to eavesdrop, whether or not he is present at the time." KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 legislation).
That statute makes eavesdropping a Class D felony. Id. § 526.020(2). "'[E]avesdrop'
means to overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of a[n] . . . oral communication of
others without the consent of at least one (1) party thereto by means of any electronic,
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Louisiana
The state statute provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
[w]illfully intercept . . . any . . . oral communication." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303.A
(Westlaw through the 2014 Regular Session with Acts effective on or before December
31, 2014). That statute provides: "Any person who violates the provisions of this Section
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned for not less than two
years nor more than ten years at hard labor." Id. § 15:1303.B. That statute further
provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this Chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral communication where such person
is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception, unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States or of the state or for the purpose of committing any other
injurious act.
Id. § 15:1303.C.(4). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 15:1302.(14).
Maine
The state statute provides:
A person is guilty of violation of privacy if, except in the execution of a
public duty or as authorized by law, that person intentionally:
B. Installs or uses in a private place without the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing,
photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events
in that place; [or]
C. Installs or uses outside a private place without the consent of the
person or persons entitled to privacy therein, any device for hearing,
recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds originating in that place
that would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible outside that
place.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511.1 (Westlaw through legislation through the
2013 Second Regular Session of the 126th Legislature). That statute provides: "'private
place' means a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from surveillance,
including, but not limited to, changing or dressing rooms, bathrooms and similar places."
Id. § 511.2. The statute further provides: "Violation of privacy is a Class D crime." Id. §
511.3. A class D crime is punishable by of imprisonment of less than one year, a fine of
not more than $2,000, orboth. Id. §§ 1152.2, 1252.2, 1301.1-A.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine interpreted "private place" to require that
a person's desire to keep private what transpires within that place must be a justifiable
expectation, and, therefore, objectively reasonable." State v. Strong, 60 A.3d 1286, 1291
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(Me. 2013). The court found that "it is objectively unreasonable for a person who
knowingly enters a place of prostitution for the purpose of engaging a prostitute to expect
that society recognizes a right to be safe from surveillance while inside." Id. Research
failed to locate case law determining whether the statute has been interpreted to allow
taping upon consent of one party to the conversation.
Minnesota
The state statute provides that "any person who ... intentionally intercepts ...
any . . . oral communication . . . shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both." MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.02.1 to 626A.02.4 (West,
Westlaw through legislation of the 2014 Regular Session effective through July 31, 2014).
That statute provides:
It is not unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color
of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral communication where such person is a
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States or of any state.
Id. § 626A.02.2.(d). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id § 626A.01.4.
Mississippi
Mississippi statute sections 41-29-501 to 41-29-535 appear to prohibit taping of a
private conversation. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-501 to 41-29-535 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Regular (End) and First and Second Extraordinary (End) Sessions).
Although the statutes provide exceptions from liability, research has not found any statute
or case law interpretation of any statute affirmatively prohibiting such taping. In addition,
it is unclear the activity to which the penalty provisions apply. The state statute provides:
(1) Any person who knowingly and intentionally possesses, installs,
operates or monitors an electronic, mechanical or other device in
violation of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to not more than one (1) year in
the county jail or fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00), or both.
(2) Any person who violates the provisions of Section 41-29-5 11 shall
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to
not more than five (5) years in the State Penitentiary and fined not more
than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).
Id § 41-29-533. The state statute allows a private individual to disclose an
intercepted oral communication if the interception was authorized:
A person who receives, by any means authorized by this article,
information concerning a[n] .. . oral .. . communication .. . intercepted
2015] Ill
51
Bast: Tipping the Scale in Favor Civilian Taping of Encounters with Pol
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
in accordance with the provisions of this article may disclose the
contents of such communication . . . while giving testimony under oath
in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States, of this
state, or of a political subdivision of this state.
Id. § 41-29-511(3).
The state statute excepts from liability:
A person not acting under color of law who intercepts a[n] . . . oral ...
communication if the person is a party to the communication, or if one
(1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States or of this state, or for the purpose of
committing any other injurious act.
Id. § 41-29-53 1(e). "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying that expectation. Id. § 41-29-501(j).
Missouri
The focus of sections 542.400-542.422 appears to be the prohibition against
taping a telephone conversation, except as authorized pursuant to those statutes, or taping
a face-to-face conversation using a microphone transmitting the conversation elsewhere.
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 542.400-.422 (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation approved
through July 14, 2014, of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 97th General
Assembly). Thus, the statutes do not appear to prohibit a participant from taping a face-to-
face conversation using a handheld tape recorder. The statutes contain a definition of "oral
communication" and a few tangential references to oral communication; otherwise, most
of the references are to "wire communication." Oral communication means "any
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." Id. §
542.400(8). A state statute provides that:
1. Except as otherwise specifically provided in sections 542.400
to 542.422, a person is guilty of a class D felony and upon conviction
shall be punished as provided by law, if such person:
(1) Knowingly intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire communication;
[or]
(2) Knowingly uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to
use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication when such device transmits
communications by radio or interferes with the transmission of such
communication; provided, however, that nothing in sections 542.400 to
542.422 shall be construed to prohibit the use by law enforcement
officers of body microphones and transmitters in undercover
investigations for the acquisition of evidence and the protection of law
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enforcement officers and others working under their direction in such
investigations.
2. It is not unlawful under the provisions of sections 542.400 to 542.422:
(2) For a person acting under law to intercept a wire or oral
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception.
(3) For a person not acting under law to intercept a wire communication
where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act.
Id. § 542.402.
Any investigative officer or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by sections 542.400 to 542.422, has lawfully obtained knowledge of
the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom,
may use such contents to the extent such use is necessary to the proper
performance of his official duties.
Id. § 542.406(2). Another statute contains a reference to oral communication in
the context of the requirement of taping an authorized interception. Id. § 542.4 10(1).
Arguably, with the few slight references to oral communication discussed above,
the criminal sanctions for taping in these statutes refer only to communication via the
telephone and to one not a party to the conversation taping a face-to-face conversation.
Research failed to discover other statutory or case law prohibitions against taping a face-
to-face conversation.
Nebraska
The state statute provides that "it is unlawful to ... [i]ntentionally intercept ...
any . . . oral communication." NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-290(1) (Westlaw through End
of 2013 Regular Session). That statute provides that "any person who violates this
subsection is guilty of a Class IV felony." Id. That statute further provides:
It is not unlawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a[n] . . . oral communication when such person is a party to the
communication or when one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception unless such ommunication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
Id. § 86-290(2)(c). The penalty for a Class IV felony is not more than "five years
imprisonment, or ten thousand dollars fine, or both." Id. § 28-105(1). "Oral
communication means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 86-283.
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Nevada
The state statute provides:
[A] person shall not intrude upon the privacy of other persons by
surreptitiously listening to, monitoring or recording ... by means of any
mechanical, electronic or other listening device, any private
conversation engaged in by the other persons, or disclose the existence,
content, substance, purport, effect or meaning of any conversation so
listened to, monitored or recorded, unless authorized to do so by one of
the persons engaging in the conversation.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 77th Regular
Session and the 27th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature and technical corrections
received from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (2013)). One who "willfully and
knowingly" violates the statute commits a category D felony. Id. § 200.690(1).
A category D felony is a felony for which a court shall sentence a
convicted person to imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not
less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 4 years. In addition to any
other penalty, the court may impose a fine of not more than $5,000, unless a
greater fine is authorized or required by statute.
Id. § 193.130(2)(d). Research failed to locate case law interpreting "private
conversation."
Certain Nevada state statutes govern the procedure for obtaining a court order to
tape an oral communication. Id §§ 179.410-.515. Pursuant to those statutes, "'[o]ral
communication' means any verbal message uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying
such expectation." Id § 179.440.
New Jersey
The state statute provides: "[A]ny person who . . . [p]urposely intercepts . . . any .
oral communication .. . shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:156A-3 (West, Westlaw through laws effective through L.2014, c. 22 and J.R. No.
3). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation . Id. § 2A: 156A-2(b). Another state statute provides an
exception for:
A person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted or used for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of this State or for the
purpose of committing any other injurious act.
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Id. § 2A: 156A-4. A crime of the third degree is punishable by imprisonment of
between three and five years, a fine of not more than $15,000, or both. Id. §§ 2C:43-2, -3,
-6.
New Mexico
Section 30-12-1 makes interference with communications a misdemeanor. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (West, Westlaw through laws of the 2nd Regular Session of the 51st
Legislature (2014), effective May 21, 2014). That statute does not contain the term "oral
communication" and has been interpreted to be inapplicable to a face-to-face
conversation. State v. Hogervorst, 566 P.2d 828, 834 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) ("[The statute]
pertains to telephone conversations or telegraph messages[] . . . [not] a face-to-face
conversation transmitted to a listener by a device concealed on one of the participants in
the conversation."). Sections 30-12-2 to 30-12-10 contain the term "oral communication"
and set the basis for obtaining a court order allowing interception of an oral
communication. Section 30-12-11 provides a civil cause of action to someone whose oral
communication has been wrongly intercepted. None of these statutes define oral
communication.
Research failed to discover other statutory or case law prohibitions against taping
a face-to-face conversation. Arguably, the criminal sanction for interfering with
communications in section 30-12-1 refers only to communication via the telephone or
telegraph and not to face-to-face conversation.
New York
"A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in . . .
mechanical overhearing of a conversation . . . ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (Westlaw
through L.2014, chapters I to 208, 210, 213, 214, 217 to 221, 227 to 231, 233, 235 to 247,
261, 267, 290, 294, 297, 302, 304, 306, 309, 316, 322, 324). The statute makes
eavesdropping a class E felony. Id. A class E felony is punishable by a minimum of one
year and a maximum of four years imprisonment, or not more than the greater of five
thousand dollars or "double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of
the crime," or both. Id. §§ 60.01(3), 70.00(2, 3), 80.00(1). "'Mechanical overhearing of a
conversation' means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or
discussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not present
thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment." Id. § 250.00(2). One court
found that "absent a reasonable expectation of privacy, the recording of conversations, per
se, is not illegal" and the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
"conversations ... heard through a hole in the floor, and tape recorded." People v. Kirsh,
575 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307 (App. Div. 1991). Other than Kirsh, research failed to discover
statutory or case law interpretation of "conversation" or "discussion."
North Carolina
The state statute provides that "a person is guilty of a Class H felony if, without
the consent of at least one party to the communication, the person . .. [w]illfully intercepts
... any . . . oral . . . communication." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-287(a) (West 2014).
"'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation . . . ." Id. § 15A-286(17). A Class H felony is punishable by
imprisonment, orfine orboth. Id. §§ 15A-1340.17, -1361, -1362.
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North Dakota
The state statute provides that "[a] person is guilty of a class C felony if he ...
[intentionally intercepts any . . . oral communication by use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device." N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02(1) (West, Westlaw
through the 2013 Regular Session of the 63rd Legislative Assembly). That statute makes it
a defense to criminal liability that "(1) The actor was a party to the communication or one
of the parties to the communication had given prior consent to such interception, and (2)
such communication was not intercepted for the purpose of committing a crime or other
unlawful harm." Id. § 12.1-15-02(3). "'Oral communication' means any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject o interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." Id. § 12.1-15-
04(5). A class C felony carries "a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment, a fine of
ten thousand dollars, or both." Id § 12.1-32-01(4).
Ohio
The state statute provides: "No person purposely shall ... [i]ntercept ... a[n] ...
oral . . . communication." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52(A) (West, Westlaw through
Files I to 140 and Statewide Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)). That statute makes its
violation a felony of the fourth degree. Id § 2933.52(C). That statute excepts from its
application:
A person who is not a law enforcement officer and who intercepts a[n]
. . oral ... communication, if the person is a party to the communication
or if one of the parties to the communication has given the person prior
consent to the interception, and if the communication is not intercepted
for the purpose of committing a criminal offense or tortious act in
violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States or this state or
for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
Id § 2933.52(B). "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying that expectation." Id. § 2933.5 1(B). A felony of the fourth
degree is punishable by imprisonment for six through eighteen months, or a maximum
fine of $5,000, orboth. Id. §§ 2929.13(A), 2929.14(A)(4), 2929.18(A).
Oklahoma
The state statute provides that:
any person is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished
by a fine of not less than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or by
imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, or by both who:
1. Willfully intercepts ... any ... oral ... communication.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.3 (West, Westlaw through chapters of the
Second Regular Session of the 54th Legislature (2014) effective July 1, 2014).
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It is not unlawful pursuant to the Security of Communications Act for:
5. a person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral ...
communication when such person is a party to the communication or
when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception unless the communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal act.
Id. § 176.4. "'Oral communication' means any communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstance justifying such expectation." Id. § 176.2(12).
Rhode Island
The state statute provides: "[a]ny person . .. who willfully intercepts . . . any ...
oral communication . . . shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years." R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-35-21(a) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 104 of the January 2014
session). That statute provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for:
(3) A person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral
communication, where the person is a party to the communication, or
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in the violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the
purpose of committing any other injurious act.
Id § 11-35-21(c). Although "oral communication" is not defined in that statute, a criminal
procedure statute defines "[o]ral communications" as "any oral communication uttered by
a person exhibiting an expectation that he communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying that expectation ..... Id. § 12-5.1-1(10).
South Carolina
Under the state statute, one who "intentionally intercepts ... any . . . oral ...
communication" commits a felony. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 17-30-20 (2014). "It is
lawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] ...
oral . . . communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception." Id § 17-30-
30(C). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying the expectation ..... Id. § 17-30-15(2).
South Dakota
The state statute provides that it is a class 5 felony if one "[n]ot present during a
conversation or discussion, intentionally and by means of an eavesdropping device
overhears or records such conversation or discussion .. . without the consent of a party to
such conversation or discussion." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (Westlaw through
the 2014 Regular Session and Supreme Court Rule 14-10). "Eavesdropping device" means
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"any electronic, mechanical, or other apparatus which is intentionally used to intercept a
wire or oral communication. . . ." Id. § 23A-35A-1(6). "Oral communication" means "any
oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation." Id. § 23A-35A-1(10). A class 5 felony is punishable by imprisonment for a
maximum of five years; in addition, a maximum fine of $10,000 may be imposed. Id. §
22-6-1.
Tennessee
The state statute provides that "a person commits an offense who . . .
[i]ntentionally intercepts ... any ... oral ... communication." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
601(a)(1) (West, Westlaw from laws from the 2014 Second Reg. Sess., eff. through June
30, 2014). That statute provides:
It is lawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to intercept
a[n] . . . oral . . . communication, where the person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to the interception, unless the communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee.
Id. § 39-13-601(b)(5). One who violates § 39-13-601(a)(1) commits a Class D felony. Id.
§ 39-13-602. Research failed to discover statutory or case law interpretation of "oral
communication."
Texas
The state statute provides that "[a] person commits an offense if the person ...
intentionally intercepts . . . a[n] . . . oral . . . communication." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
16.02(b) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd
Legislature). That statute excepts from criminal liability:
[A] person not acting under color of law [who] intercepts a[n] ... oral. .
communication, if:
(A) the person is a party to the communication; or
(B) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to the interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing an unlawful act.
Id. § 16.02(c). That statute further makes violation of the statute a felony of the second
degree. Id. § 16.02(f). A violation is punishable as follows:
(a) An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the second degree shall
be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years.
(b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a
felony of the second degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed
$10,000.
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Id. § 12.33. "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying that expectation." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20(2)
(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature).
Utah
The state statute provides that "[a] person commits a violation of this subsection
who . . . intentionally or knowingly intercepts . . . any . . . oral communication." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014 General Session). That statute
provides that:
A person not acting under color of law may intercept a[n] . . . oral
communication if that person is a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of state or federal
laws.
Id. § 77-23a-4(7)(b). A violation of the statute is a third degree felony. Id. § 77-23a-
4(10)(a). A third degree felony is punishable by not more than five years imprisonment, or
a fine of not more than $5,000, or both. Id. §§ 76-3-201(2), 76-3-203(3), 76-3-301(1).
"'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that the communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances
justifying that expectation. . . ." Id. § 77-23a-3(13).
Vermont
This state has no statute prohibiting eavesdropping. However, the Vermont
Supreme Court has interpreted the search and seizure provision of Chapter 1, Article 11 of
the Vermont Constitution to prohibit a police officer from secretly taping a suspect's
conversation where the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Geraw,
795 A.2d 1219, 1221-22 (Vt. 2002) (stating that a suspect had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the home but not in a parking lot).
Virginia
The state statute provides that "any person who . . . [i]ntentionally intercepts ...
any . . . oral communication . . . shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony." VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-62(A) (West, Westlaw through the End of the 2014 Reg. Sess. and the End of the
2014 Sp. Sess. I). That statute provides: "It shall not be a criminal offense under this
chapter for a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral communication, where such person is a party
to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception." Id. § 19.2-62(B)(2). "'Oral communication' means any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectations . Id. §
19.2-61. A class 6 felony is punishable by:
[A] term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without
ajury, confinement injail for not more than 12 months and a fine of not
more than $2,500, either or both.
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Id. § 18.2-10(f).
West Virginia
The state statute provides that "it is unlawful for any person to . . . [i]ntentionally
intercept . . . any . . . oral . . . communication." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-lD-3(a) (West,
Westlaw through laws of the 2014 Second Extraordinary Session). That statute provides:
"Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not more than five years or
fined not more than ten thousand dollars or both fined and imprisoned." Id. § 62-lD-3(b).
That statute further provides:
It is lawful under this article for a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral ...
communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception
unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
States or the constitution or laws of this state.
Id. § 62-lD-3(e). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 62-lD-2(h).
Wisconsin
One who "[i]ntentionally intercepts ... any . . . oral communication" commits a
Class H felony. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380,
published 4/25/2014). That statute provides that:
It is not unlawful . . . [f]or a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a[n] . . . oral communication where the person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution
or laws of the United States or of any state or for the purpose of committing any
other injurious act.
Id. § 968.31(2). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying the expectation." Id. § 968.27(12). The punishment for a
Class H felony is "a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 years, or
both." Id. § 939.50(3).
Wyoming
The state statute provides that "no person shall intentionally ... [i]ntercept . ..
any . . . oral . . . communication." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702(a) (West, Westlaw through
the 2014 Budget Sess.). That statute does not prohibit "[a]ny person from intercepting an
oral . . . communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one
(1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception unless
the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious
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act." Id. § 7-3-702(b). "[A]ny person who violates this section is guilty of a felony
punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), imprisonment for
not more than five (5) years, or both. Id. § 7-3-702(f). "'Oral communication' means any
oral communication uttered by a person who reasonably expects and circumstances justify
the expectation that the communication is not subject to interception . Id. § 7-3-
701 (a)(xi).
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